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COASE AND THE CONTROL OF TRANSBOUNDARY 
POLLUTION: THE SALE OF HYDROELECTRICITY 
UNDER THE UNITED STATES-CANADA FREE 
TRADE AGREEMENT OF 1988 
Barbara K. Bucholtz' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Free trade agreements sometimes can act as surrogates for tra-
ditional international regulation. Recently scientific understanding 
and public awareness of transboundary pollution have provided the 
impetus for multilateral agreements designed to curtail transboun-
dary pollution. Among the major air pollution agreements are the 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, the Sul-
phur Emissions Protocol, the Nitrogen Oxides Emissions Protocol, 
the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, and 
the Montreal Protocol. 1 These agreements represent an 
• University Fellow of Law and LL.M., Environmental Law, George Washington Univer-
sity, The National Law Center. The author would like to thank Professor Lynn A. Stout, 
Georgetown University Law Center, and Professor Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Director of Envi-
ronmental Law, George Washington University, for their comments on drafts of this Article. 
1 The precursor of these agreements was the Stockholm Declaration of 1972, Declaration 
of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, adopted June 16, 1972, U.N. 
Doc. AlConf.48/14 (1972), reprinted in 11 LL.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Decla-
ration]. The Stockholm Declaration evinced a concerted effort to develop international fora 
and mechanisms for the regulation of trans boundary pollution. Subsequently, several accords 
have been reached. In the arena of trans boundary air pollution, the major agreements are: 
the Nitrogen Oxides Emissions Protocol of 1988, Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides 
or Their Transboundary Fluxes, done Nov. 1, 1988, reprinted in 28 LL.M. 212 (1989) [here-
inafter Nitrogen Oxides Emission Protocol]; the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer, opened for signature Sept. 16, 1987, reprinted in 26 LL.M. 1541 (1987) 
[hereinafter Montreal Protocol]; the Sulfur Emissions Protocol of 1985, Protocol to the 1979 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on the Reduction of Sulfur Emissions 
or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Percent, done July 9, 1985, reprinted in Report 
of the Third Session of the Executive Body of the Convention on Long-Range Trwnsboundary 
Air Pollution, U.N. Doc. ECE/EB.AIRI7, annex 1; the Vienna Convention for the Protection 
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"internationalization"2 of environmental regulation modeled after 
conventional international accords.3 Because the parties to interna-
tional accords are sovereign states, each party must generate suffi-
cient domestic political support to enact an international regulatory 
accord. As Robert Hahn and Kenneth Richards have stated, 
"[D]omestic politics plays a substantial, and perhaps dominant, role" 
in the forming of international environmental agreements. 4 Domestic 
politics, then, is pivotal in achieving multilateral accord. 
What happens when the specter of domestic politics acts as a 
barrier to multilateral accord on regulation of a serious transboun-
dary pollution problem? Are there no alternatives to the format of 
traditional international law? This Article proposes that, in the ab-
sence of requisite domestic political consensus, market forces-
through the auspices of free trade agreements-may be employed 
as. a substitute for traditional international regulation. This Article 
proposes that Hardin's "commons" may occasionally be saved from 
"tragedy"5 by applying a variant of Coase's theorem:6 in the absence 
of "hard Law,"7 the bargaining of private parties in free trade arenas 
may result in a curtailment of transboundary pollution. 
The Montreal Protocol, 8 for example, is widely acclaimed as a 
prototypical mechanism for the regulation of transboundary pollu-
tion. 9 As will be discussed subsequently, however,10 fortuitous cir-
of the Ozone Layer, opened for signature Mar. 22, 1985, U.N. Doc. UNEP/IG.53/5/Rev.l, 
reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1529 (1987) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10,541, reprinted in 18 
I. L.M. 1442 (1979). For a more complete discussion of the evolution of international environ-
mental law, see Lang, Environmental Protection: The Challenge for International Law, 20 
J. WORLD TRADE L. 489 (1986). 
2 Hahn & Richards, The Internationalization of Environmental Regulation, 30 HARV. 
INT'L L.J. 421, 423 (1989). 
3 See id. at 423-24. 
4 Id. at 422. 
5 See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). See infra notes 172-
81 and accompanying text. 
6 See generally Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Coase argued 
that governmental regulation is not necessarily the most efficacious social mechanism for 
dealing with the harmful effects of industries. See infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text. 
7 "Hard law" refers to international agreements--for example, treaties, conventions, or 
protocols that pertain to the regulation of a specific pollutant or environmental problem-in 
contrast to "soft law," which sets forth guidelines on more general subjects of environmental 
concern. See Lang, supra note 1, at 495. 
8 Montreal Protocol, supra note 1. 
9 See, e.g., Mintz, Keeping Pandora's Box Shut: A Critical Assessment of the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 565, 
577 (1989). 
10 See infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text. 
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cumstances surrounded its formation, thus generating the domestic 
consensus required for its ratification. Its applicability to other trans-
boundary pollution problems, therefore, will be limited to those 
situations in which a similar political consensus is available. 
The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA),11 by 
contrast, assiduously avoided the issue of transboundary acid rain 
in spite of the fact that the issue was a vital component of the 
negotiations preceding ratification of the Agreement. 12 N everthe-
less, by providing a free trade arena for the sale of Canadian hy-
droelectricity to United States markets, the FTA will act as a ca-
talyst for acceleration of these sales. To the extent that Canadian 
hydroelectricity displaces existing United States energy-producing 
facilities that are major contributors to acid rain, the FTA will 
ameliorate the transboundary acid rain problem. 13 Thus, a free trade 
agreement can be an important mechanism for encouraging environ-
mentally benign behavior through the auspices of the marketplace, 
where political forces make a hard law regulatory approach infeasi-
ble. 
Part II of this Article reviews the ozone depletion problem and 
the provisions of the Montreal Protocol that attempt to curtail it. 
Part II also identifies the forces that impelled ratification of the 
Protocol, and concludes with an assessment of the Protocol's general 
applicability to other transboundary pollution problems. Part II con-
tains some background materials on the trans boundary acid rain 
problem between the United States and Canada. It also discusses 
the development of the FTA against the backdrop of domestic poli-
tics. Part III assesses the impact of the sale of Canadian hydroelec-
tricity to United States markets under the FTA. Part IV concludes 
with a discussion of free trade agreements as vehicles for trans-
boundary pollution abatement. 
II. OZONE DEPLETION AND THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL 
A. The Problem: Ozone Depletion 
The effects of various pollutants on the ozone layer are now well-
documented. 14 The scientific findings relative to these effects may 
11 The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988 [herein-
after FTA] can be found at Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (1988). 
12 See, e.g., Carson, Environmental Protection, Unfair Competition and the U.S.-Canada 
Free Trade Discussions, 12 CANADA-U.S. L.J. 263, 263-64 (1987). 
13 See infra notes 125-39 and accompanying text. 
14 The ozone layer is a 20-mile veil of gas in the stratosphere that shields the earth from 
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be described briefly as follows. Ozone (03) is an unstable form of 
oxygen. It contains three oxygen atoms, while ordinary oxygen 
contains twO. 15 Ozone is created in the upper atmosphere when 
sunlight acts on oxygen (02) molecules, and, in a balanced process, 
ozone is simultaneously destroyed when certain naturally occurring 
chemicals in the upper atmosphere (for example, nitrogen oxides) 
react with it and return it to O2 • 16 Scientists now understand that 
this dynamic balance has been upset as man-made chemicals, or 
chemicals released by industrial processes and products, have tipped 
the balance in favor of destruction of ozone. 17 Of the man-made 
chemicals that contribute to this destructive process, chlorofluoro-
carbons (CFCS)18 and halons19 appear to be the most significant. 20 
CFCs are particularly pernicious because they are chemically inert 
and can remain in the atmosphere for over one hundred years, 
continuing to act upon ozone. 21 In fact, it is the characteristic chem-
ical stability of CFCs that has made them so attractive for industrial 
processes and commercial products. 22 
When CFCs and halons are released to the upper at-
mosphere, they act to destroy the ozone layer in the strato-
solar ultraviolet radiation. See, e.g., Ozone Layer Depletions: Hearing before the Subcomm. 
on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 
1st Sess. 2 (1987). 
16 For the original scientific analysis of the ozone problem, see Molina & Rowland, Strato-
spheric Sink for Chlorojluoromethanes: Chlorine Atom-Catalyzed Destruction of Ozone, 249 
NATURE 810, 810-12 (1974); see also R. WHITTEN & S. PRASAD, OZONE IN THE FREE 
ATMOSPHERE (1985). 
16 See Andreae, The Oceans as a Source of Biogenic Gases, OCEANUS, Winter 1986/87, at 
27,30. 
17 See, e.g., Taubes & Chen, Made in the Shade? No Way, DISCOVER, Aug. 1987, at 62, 
64. 
18 Stolarski, The Antarctic Ozone Hole, SCI. AM., Jan. 1988, at 30, 32-35. 
19 See Award Paper, International Cooperation in Protection of Atmospheric Ozone: The 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 
413, 415 n.15 (1988). 
20 Other gases that contribute to ozone depletion are nitrogen oxides (NOx), nitrous oxide 
(N20), methane (CH4), and carbon dioxide (C02). Id. at 414-15. However, annex A to the 
Montreal Protocol covers only CFCs and halons because of their disproportionate impact on 
ozone. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, at annex A, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1561. 
21 Titus & Sidel, Overview of the Effects of Changing the Atmosphere, in EFFECTS OF 
CHANGES IN STRATOSPHERIC OZONE AND GLOBAL CLIMATE 4 (J. Titus ed. 1986). See also 
ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES BOARD OF THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CAUSES AND 
EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN STRATOSPHERIC OZONE: UPDATE 1983 (1984), cited in Award Paper, 
supra note 19, at 414 n.3. 
22 Taubes & Chen, supra note 17, at 64. CFCs are used in refrigeration and air-conditioning 
systems, as propellants in aerosol spray cans, as agents in the manufacture of synthetic foam, 
and as cleaning and sterilizing agents for equipment components. See Barnett, Ozone Protec-
tion: The Need for a Global Solution, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY J., Dec. 1986, at 10. 
Halons are employed in fire extinguishers. I d. 
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sphere. 23 The ozone layer shields the earth from solar ultraviolet 
radiation by absorbing it.24 This absorption is of critical importance 
in relation to one form of ultraviolet radiation, UV -B, because of its 
deleterious effects on the earth's surface. 25 When UV-B penetrates 
the stratosphere, it poses significant threats to human health. 26 It 
also affects flora, fauna, and ecosystems. 27 The scientific investiga-
tion that established these findings was precipitated by the study of 
M.J. Molina and F.S. Rowland, which initially asserted the cause-
and-effect relationship between CFCs and ozone depletion. 28 
From 1974 to 1985, as scientific evidence mounted, it generated 
the public concern and political support required to achieve some 
sort of international accord. The result was the framework agree-
ment known as the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer,29 which was prepared for signature in March 1985.30 
The Vienna Convention recognized a duty on the part of signatories 
to protect human health and the environment from ozone-depleting 
substances;31 it promoted cooperation among signatories in scientific 
research on the ozone depletion problem;32 it established a procedural 
and administrative framework both for the Convention's 
23 See Award Paper, supra note 19, at 414-15. 
24 Bruce, Man's Impact on Earth's Atmosphere, in EFFECT OF CHANGES IN STRATO-
SPHERIC OZONE AND GLOBAL CLIMATE 41 (J. Titus ed. 1986), cited in Award Paper, supra 
note 19, at 414 n.6. 
25 Rowland, A Threat to Earth's Protective Shield, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY J., Dec. 
1986, at 4. 
26 For an analysis of UV-B's impact on the human immune system and the link between 
exposure to UV-B and increasing incidents of human cancer, see J. ARBUCKLE, N. BRYSON, 
D. CASE, C. CHERNEY, R. HALL, JR., J. MARTON, J. MILLER, M. MILLER, W. PEDERSON, 
JR., R. RANDLE, R. STOLL, T. SULLIVAN & T. VANDERVER, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
HANDBOOK (9th ed. 1987). 
?:7 For example, scientists predict a significant increase in plant mutations due to UV-B 
radiation, and studies have shown that UV-B radiation diminishes production of phytoplank-
ton, a vital link in the aquatic food chain. UV -B also reduces the reproduction of higher forms 
of aquatic life. Comment, The Montreal Protocol: Confronting the Threat to Earth's Ozone 
Layer, 63 WASH. L. REV. 997, 998 (1988). 
28 Molina & Rowland, supra note 15, at 810. 
29 Vienna Convention, supra note 1, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1529. The Convention went 
into effect on September 22, 1988, when it had been signed by the requisite 20 nations. 
European Community Ratifies Vienna Accord, Says It Will Act on Ozone Protocol Very 
Soon, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 584 (Nov. 9, 1988). For a complete discussion ofthe procedural 
steps leading to ratification of the Vienna Convention, see Kindt & Menefee, The Vexing 
Problem of Ozone Depletion in International Environmental Law and Policy, 24 TAX INT'L 
L.J. 261, 270-77 (1989). 
30 Vienna Convention, supra note 1, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1540. The United States 
ratified the Convention on August 29, 1986. Treaties, DEP'T ST. BULL., Nov. 1986, at 88. 
31 Vienna Convention, supra note 1, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1529-30. 
32 Id., reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1530-31. 
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implementation33 and for dispute resolution concerning its interpre-
tation. 34 Due to nationalistic and interest group factionalism, how-
ever, sufficient political support for establishing a regulatory regime 
was not garnered. 
Because the factionalism that emerged during negotiations on the 
Vienna Convention are endemic to the struggle to achieve multilat-
eral agreement on environmental problems, it may be instructive to 
identify the major protagonists. First, because of the rapidly emerg-
ing scientific discoveries during the negotiation period, there was 
some confusion within the scientific community regarding the prob-
lem. As Dr. Mostofa K. Tolba, Executive Director of the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), stated, the "under-
standing of the problem ... changed rapidly, even from one working 
group meeting to the next. Not everyone [could] agree on one single 
theory. "35 Second, the division among the parties to the Convention 
reflected their various nationalistic and economic interests. The de-
veloped nations tended to support a more active approach to a reg-
ulatory regime than the underdeveloped nations, whose primary 
agenda was to achieve economic and industrial parity with the in-
dustrial nations, even at the expense of the environment. 36 Similarly, 
on the issue of a regulatory regime, the industrialized nations were 
polarized between the European Common Market countries, which 
advocated a production capacity ceiling on CFCs and halons,37 and 
the "Toronto Group,"38 which supported "an 80 percent reduction or 
complete ban" on "nonessential uses" of aerosols.39 Third, there was 
the ubiquitous split between environmentalists, who favored the 
most stringent controls, and industry, which favored a wait-and-see 
approach.40 Thus, while the Convention established a framework for 
88 Id., reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1531-82. 
34 Id., reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1533-84. 
85 Sand, Protecting the Ozone Layer: The Vienna Convention is Adopted, ENV'T, June 
1985, at 19, 20. 
86 Doolittle, Underestimating Ozone Depletion: The Meandering Road to the Montreal 
Protocol and Beyond, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 407, 419 (1989) (citing ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECT ON 
CENTRAL AMERICA (EPOCA), EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE, CENTRAL AMERICA: ROOTS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION (EPOCAIGreen Paper No.2, 1986)). 
87 Sand, supra note 35, at 41. Because the production of these European Economic Com-
munity (EEC) countries was below the proposed ceiling, this regulatory scheme would not 
affect them. Kindt & Menefee, supra note 29, at 276. 
88 The Toronto Group consisted of Canada, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and the United 
States. Sand, supra note 35, at 41. 
89 Id. 
40 See generally Taubes & Chen, supra note 17. In the debate over regulation of aerosols, 
industry argued that in the absence of "indisputable" scientific evidence of "immediate" danger, 
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addressing the ozone depletion problem, all efforts to establish a 
regulatory regime were undercut by the nationalist and interest 
group politics41 represented by the factions described above. Sub-
sequent developments in the next few years, however, engendered 
a critical mass of political support for international regulation of 
ozone-depleting agents. 
Shortly after the Vienna Convention was prepared for signature, 
British scientists reported finding a seasonal, but significant, dimin-
ution of the ozone layer over the Antarctic.42 These findings, widely 
publicized as the "ozone hole" phenomenon, created significant public 
alarm. The findings also inspired renewed efforts to achieve inter-
national agreement on regulation of the ozone problem. 43 These ef-
forts culminated in the system of controls established by the Mon-
treal Protocol. 44 The efforts, which eventually overcame the 
resistance of domestic politics, were sparked by the British report 
of the Antarctic "ozone hole" and fueled by prior reports of the 
crucial role that the ozone layer plays in protecting the earth's well-
being. 45 In addition, conclusive evidence of the "ozone hole," taken 
in conjunction with reports that whatever damage had been done to 
the ozone layer might be irreversible and might also increase expo-
nentially,46 lent an apocalyptic hue to the ozone depletion problem. 
Finally, during this pivotal period between the formation of the 
regulatory control would be "precipitous." [d. at 65. Industry proferred this same argument 
in the debate over acid rain. [d. 
41 See Hahn & Richards, supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
42 Taubes & Chen, supra note 17, at 62; Stolarski, The Antarctic Ozone Hole, SCI. AM., 
Jan. 1988, at 30. A NASA Satellite report confirmed the finding three months later. Taubes 
& Chen, supra note 17, at 63. Nevertheless, scientists still were unable to agree upon a single 
theory concerning the phenomenon, which has subsequently been confirmed. One group of 
scientists, known as "dynamists," considered the "hole" to be the result of naturally occurring 
variations in the atmosphere. [d. at 68. The other scientific group, made up of chemists, 
believed that chemicals were the cause of the phenomenon. [d. The latter group's theory was 
vindicated by subsequent scientific investigations on the part of a scientific undertaking known 
as the National Ozone Expedition (NOZE), co-sponsored by three United States federal 
agencies. NOZE found that, while dynamic fluctuations were clearly involved, chemical assault 
on the ozone layer was the principal cause of ozone depletion. [d. at 69-70. 
48 In 1986, after NASA confirmed the British report, id. at 63, workshops sponsored by 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) under the auspices of the Vienna 
Convention began to hammer out proposed mechanisms for the control of CFCs and halons. 
Award Paper, supra note 19, at 417. 
44 Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1541. 
45 See supra notes 14-28 and accompanying text. 
46 Benedick, Protecting the Ozone Layer, DEP'T ST. BULL., Apr. 1985, at 63. Additionally, 
in 1988, alarming news that the ozone layer over the United States, Canada, Western Europe, 
the U.S.S.R., China, and Japan was thinning at a rapid rate reached the public. Comment, 
supra note 27, at 998. 
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Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol, industry began to 
back away from its "no immediate danger" position and to intimate 
that substitutes for CFCs might be forthcoming. 47 
The importance of the availability of an environmentally "safe"48 
alternative to products that generate pollution should not be mini-
mized. It is not too much to say that, where the benefits of a pollutant 
can be achieved by a more environmentally benign substitute with-
out serious disruption of the consumption and lifestyle patterns of 
societies, the availability of that substitute will playa significant role 
in generating the political support that is crucial to agreement on 
pollution abatement regulation. To put it bluntly, the public will be 
more amenable to environmental regulation that does not restrict 
the availability of modern amenities. 
In the arena of global ozone depletion, the factors identified above 
were sufficient to overcome the factionalism that blocked efforts to 
control ozone-depleting substances. As a result, a regulatory regime 
was established under the auspices of the Montreal Protocol. 49 
47 The Association for a Responsible CFC Policy, which represents E.!. Du Pont de 
Nemours & Co. and other CFC producers, launched a concerted effort to create CFC substi-
tutes. Doolittle, supra note 36, at 413. The Association, however, also maintained a public 
stance opposing international regulation of CFCs. Id. By 1988, companies within the industry 
reported that safe substitutes were available. Id. at 414. In 1989, Du Pont, which is the 
largest producer of CFCs in the United States, announced that it had patented a CFC 
substitute for use in various cooling units, including refrigerators and air conditioners, and 
that the company would completely phase out its production of CFCs by the end of the decade. 
Du Pont Creates Replacement for Ozone-Depleting Chemical, Wash. Post, Jan. 31, 1989, at 
A6, col. 1. Most recently, Du Pont announced that its "world-wide" production of CFC 
substitutes would begin between 1992 and 1995. Hamilton, Du Pont Plans to Invest in Phase-
Out of CFCs, Wash. Post, June 22, 1990, at Fl, col. 5. 
48 In the case of CFCs, the "safe" substitutes are less stable than CFCs and therefore 
break down more rapidly. They also contain no chlorine, the agent in CFCs that attacks the 
ozone. For a discussion of the substitutes, see Doolittle, supra note 36, at 414-15. 
49 The Montreal Protocol was opened for signature on Sept. 16, 1987. Montreal Protocol, 
supra note 1, reprinted in 26 !.L.M. at 1550. The signatories were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Ghana, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Portugal, Senegal, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Togo, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, and the EEC. UNITED NATIONS MULTI-
LATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARy-GENERAL: STATUS AS AT 31 DECEM-
BER 1987, at 802, U.N. Doc. St/Leg/Ser.E/6, U.N. Sales No. E.88.V.3 (1988). Subsequently, 
the following nations became signatories: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Burkina, Byelorus-
sian S.S.R., Chile, Congo, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, 
Morocco, Philippines, Spain, Thailand, Uganda, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R. Treaties, DEP'T 
ST. BULL., Apr. 1988, at 87; Treaties, DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1988, at 68; Treaties, DEP'T 
ST. BULL., Aug. 1988, at 92; Treaties, DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1988, at 83; Treaties, DEP'T 
ST. BULL., Oct. 1988, at 84; Treaties, DEP'T ST. BULL., Feb. 1989, at 74. 
On April 21, 1988, the United States ratified the Montreal Protocol. Treaties, DEP'T ST. 
BULL., June 1988, at 68. The Montreal Protocol entered into force on January 1, 1989, when 
11 parties had ratified it. 
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B. Montreal Protocol: An Assessment 
Four principle components comprise the Montreal Protocol's reg-
ulatory scheme. First, it contains a freeze and reduction schedule 
for CFCs and halons. 50 Second, it provides certain incentives for 
developing countries to participate. 51 Third, it imposes restrictions 
on non-party trade in ozone-depleting substances. 52 Fourth, it calls 
for ongoing reassessment of the scientific, technological, and eco-
nomic data on ozone depletion with a view to providing for periodic 
revisions of the reduction requirements. 53 
These regulatory provisions of the Montreal Protocol54 represent 
an appreciable leap forward in the evolution of international envi-
50 Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, art. 2, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1552-54. 
51 Id. art. 5, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1555-56; id. art. 9, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1556; 
id. art. 10, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1557. 
52 Id. art. 4, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1554-55. 
53 Id. art. 6, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1556. This innovative provision may prove crucial 
to the success of the Montreal Protocol, since ongoing scientific investigations indicate that, 
without a mechanism for revising its regulatory component, the Montreal Protocol could 
become outdated in short order. For example, shortly after it went into effect, an "ozone hole" 
smaller than the one over Antarctica was discovered over the Arctic region, causing specu-
lation that damage to the ozone layer was already worse than anticipated during the Protocol 
negotiations. See Booth, Hole in the Ozone Layer Found at North Pole Too, Wash. Post, 
March 16, 1990, at AIO, col. 1. For the first publicized report of the Arctic hole, see Kerr, 
Evidence of Arctic Ozone Destruction, 240 SCIENCE 1144 (1988); Kerr, Ozone Hole Bodes III 
for the Globe, 241 SCIENCE 785 (1988). 
Most recently, fears that the regulatory regime of the Protocol was inadequate to abate the 
ozone damage have inspired a three-day conference in London to consider revisions to the 
reduction time table of the Protocol. It is interesting to notice the new alignment of the 
parties at the London conference. There, the environmentalists have joined with the devel-
oping nations, charging that the United States-a principal proponent of reduction during the 
Protocol negotiations-is now unwilling to be sufficiently proactive. William K. Reilly, admin-
istrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, announced the United States position: a 
commitment to a 20% reduction of CFCs by 1993 and a complete ban by the year 2000. Many 
conferees charge that this approach is inadequate to protect the earth's atmosphere. In 
addition, developing countries are asking industrialized nations to transfer ozone-friendly 
technology to them on a "preferential and non-commercial basis." The United States is re-
sisting this approach. See Frankel, U.S. Stance Criticized at Ozone Conference, Wash. Post, 
June 28, 1990, at A34, col. 1. However, conferees have been able to agree on establishing a 
fund of at least $160 million for distribution to developing countries over the next three years 
to aid them in eliminating technologies harmful to the ozone layer. Frankel, Governments 
Agree on Ozone Fund, Wash. Post, June 30, 1990, at AI, col. 5. 
The position of the Bush administration notwithstanding, as of August 4, 1990, both houses 
of Congress had agreed upon legislation committing the United States to a more rapid phase-
out of CFCs than required by the London conference discussed above. Weisskopt, Conferees 
Agree on Ozone Plan, Wash. Post, Aug. 4, 1990, at A4, col. 1. 
54 The substantive provisions of the Montreal Protocol are found in articles 2 through 10. 
See Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1552-57. Specifically, article 2 
provides control measures for CFC compounds and halons wherein the parties to the Protocol 
must freeze and gradually reduce their production and consumption of these "controlled 
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ronmental law from its inception in 1972 with the precatory state-
ment of Principle 21. 55 While the exhortation of Principle 21 is im-
plicit in the provisions of the Montreal Protocol,56 its regulatory 
regime exhibits a suhstantive commitment to resolving the trans-
boundary environmental problem of ozone depletion. The acclaim it 
substances." ld., reprinted in 26 1.L.M. at 1552-54. Article 2 requires each party to freeze 
its yearly production of the substance at 1986 levels and then reduce production to 80% of 
that level over a five-year period beginning July 1, 1993. This is followed by an additional 
reduction phase beginning July 1, 1998. ld. The controlled substances are divided into two 
groups. Group I lists the CFC compounds and their ozone-depleting potential; Group II lists 
the halons covered by the Protocol and their ozone-depleting potential. See id. annex A, 
reprinted in 26 1.L.M. at 1561. Producers are permitted to determine the mix of the substances 
produced as long as the substances remain within the permissible production and consumption 
levels. See id., reprinted in 26 1. L.M. at 1552-54. Article 3 provides the methods for calculating 
permissible consumption and production levels of controlled substances. In calculating the 
permissible consumption level, producers are prohibited from subtracting any export of con-
trolled substances to non-parties. ld., reprinted in 26 1.L.M. at 1554. 
Article 5 makes special concessions to developing countries that have a consumption rate 
of controlled substances less than 0.3 kilograms per capita. See id., reprinted in 26 1.L.M. at 
1555-56. Qualifying parties may delay compliance with article 2 provisions. A qualifying party 
is permitted to use an average of its consumption between 1995 and 1997 as the base for its 
compliance with the control measures (the base year for all other parties is 1986). ld. Also 
under article 5, non-qualifying parties agree to help qualifying parties access environmentally 
safe alternative substances and technology. ld. 
While article 5 permits exceptions for certain parties, article 4 is designed to curtail activities 
with non-parties. See id., reprinted in 26 1.L.M. at 1554-55. First, article 4 requires each 
party to ban bulk imports of controlled substances from non-party states by 1990. Parties also 
must ban the import of products containing controlled substances from non-party states within 
four years of the Protocol's inception. ld. Within five years of the Protocol's inception, the 
parties must determine the feasibility of banning or restricting imports of products produced 
with controlled substances from non-parties. ld. Exports of controlled substance technologies 
to non-parties or assistance to non-parties regarding controlled substance production is dis-
couraged. ld. para. 5, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1555. 
Articles 6, 7, and 8 respectively provide for reassessment of the Protocol's efficacy, for 
reporting of relevant data, and for exchange of research data. See id., reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 
at 1556. Article 8 requires parties to consider development of non-compliance enforcement 
mechanisms. ld. Articles 9 and 10 require that parties offer developing nations technological 
assistance in producing controlled substance substitutes. See id., reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 
1556-57. 
66 Principle 21 of the 1972 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment declared that: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles 
of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to 
their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
Stockholm Declaration, supra note 1, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. at 1420. 
66 In fact, Principle 21 is quoted in the Preamble to the Vienna Convention, the precursor 
of the Montreal Protocol. See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 
1529. 
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has received is therefore deserved. 57 The Protocol binds the parties 
to specific reductions of controlled substances. 58 At the same time, 
the flexibility of its implementation provisions evinces a recognition 
of the necessity to synthesize economic and environmental con-
cerns.59 The Protocol is also notable for its attempt to encourage 
universal participation through systems of incentives60 and disincen-
tives. 61 The Protocol is innovative because it adopts a prospective 
67 On the issue of trans boundary air pollution, only the Sulfur Emissions Protocol of 1985 
and the Nitrogen Oxides Emissions Protocol of 1988 have achieved analogous agreement on 
substantive reduction of the offending pollutants. See Sulfur Emissions Protocol of 1985, supra 
note 1; Nitrogen Oxides Emissions Protocol, supra note 1. For a discussion of these Protocols, 
see Frankel, The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution: Meeting the 
Challenge of International Cooperation, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 447 (1989). 
By cont!'aSt, the United States-Canada negotiations on acid rain have progressed no further 
than a 1980 Memorandum of Intent. See Steiner, The North American Acid Rain Problem: 
Applying International Legal Principles Economically Without Burdening Bilateral Rela-
tions, 12 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 1, 28 (1988). 
68 Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1552-53; see also supra note 
54. It has been noted that the substantial reductions under the Protocol are unprecedented 
in international environmental regulation. Award Paper, supra note 19, at 426. 
69 Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1552-54; see also supra note 
54. For example, nations are permitted to meet their freeze and reduction requirements, in 
part or even in toto, by eliminating non-essential uses of the controlled substances. See supra 
note 54 and accompanying text. However, the impact of this provision falls unevenly on the 
parties. For example, prior to ratification of the Protocol, the United States had already 
banned non-essential aerosol products using CFCs. Use of Chlorofluorocarbons in Self-Pres-
surized Containers, 21 C.F.R. § 2.125 (1990). In addition, § 157(6) of the Clean Air Act 
requires the EPA to promulgate regulations to curtail production of substances that damage 
the stratosphere if the damage "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or 
welfare." Clean Air Act § 157, 42 U.S.C. § 7457(b) (1982); see also Protection of Stratospheric 
Ozone, 40 C.F.R. § 82 (1990) (the EPA's proposed rulemaking effective upon the Protocol's 
entry into force (Jan. 1989». This rule mandates compliance with, and implementation of, the 
Montreal Protocol pursuant to § 157(b) of the Clean Air Act. Id. § 82.1. 
It is apparent that countries that had no laws similar to those of the United States banning 
CFC aerosols prior to 1986, the base year for article 2 compliance, will be able to meet their 
reduction requirement under the Protocol with less impact on their economies. 
60 Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, art. 5, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1555-56; supra note 
54 and accompanying text. Article 5 encourages participation of developing countries that 
otherwise might find article 2 compliance unacceptably restrictive of their technological de-
velopment. Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, art. 5, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1555-56. It 
therefore affords them more lenient compliance standards. Id. It should be noted, however, 
that this leniency has the effect of encouraging increased consumption by nations that qualify 
for article 5 treatment. It is also unclear what the "basic domestic needs" to which an article 
5 nation must limit itself can include. I d. Conceivably, a liberal construction of that term could 
expand consumption and production beyond the scope of assistance that article 5 was designed 
to provide. 
Articles 9 and 10 encourage the transfer of technical assistance to developing countries, 
another important incentive for participation in the Protocol's regime. Id., reprinted in 26 
I.L.M. at 1556-57; see also supra note 54. 
61 Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, art. 4, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1554-55. See also 
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approach-an attempt to avert environmental damage prior to ca-
tastrophe, rather than "cleaning up" after the fact.62 It also seeks to 
curtail non-point source or multiple source pollution, a task of Her-
culean proportions. 63 Finally, its provisions for reassessment of the 
scientific and technological data that underpin its regulatory system 
and its provisions for revision in the face of those reassessments64 
surely will prove to be essential components of its success. Indeed 
these are vital elements of any trans boundary accord in the field of 
environmental law. 65 
Given its notable achievements, then, it is not surprising that the 
Montreal Protocol is often cited as a prototype for agreements on 
regulation of other transfrontier pollution problems including that of 
acid rain. 66 But, as this Article will show, the transboundary acid 
rain problem between the United States and Canada has not been 
amenable to that sort of resolution. Specifically, it has not been the 
beneficiary of the kinds of fortuitous circumstances that overrode 
supra note 54. Article 4, by imposing certain restrictions on the import of controlled substances 
from non-party nations, seems designed to encourage them to become signatories of the 
Protocol. By curtailing the potential export market of non-parties, this provision appears to 
be an effective economic device to achieve environmental goals. However, the article's effec-
tiveness is seriously diluted by the cautious approach of its terms. First, the ban on imports 
of products produced with controlled substances is deferred under article 4(4). And the ban 
on bulk shipments is an invitation to Protocol evasion because controlled substances could still 
be made available through imports of products that contain controlled substances. 
It is also unfortunate that the spirit of international cooperation stopped short of including 
enforcement mechanisms and sanctions within the original Protocol. Montreal Protocol, supra 
note 1, art. 8, reprinted in 26 LL.M. at 1556; see also supra note 54. 
62 Award Paper, supra note 58, at 424-25. 
63 I d. at 425. 
64 Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, at arts. 2(9), 2(10), 6, reprinted in 26 LL.M. at 1553-
54, 1556; see also supra note 54. 
65 It frequently has been noted that one significant shortcoming of the Protocol is that it 
was scientifically outdated before the "ink was dry." Clearly, the reduction compliance sched-
ules are inadequate to meet the ozone depletion problem as scientists now understand it. See, 
e.g., Award Paper, supra note 58, at 429. It has been estimated, for example, that damage 
to the ozone layer is occurring at a rate two or three times that assumed during Protocol 
negotiations. Doolittle, supra note 36, at 431. 
What has been called "the ultimate problem of ozone depletion," see Kindt & Menefee, 
supra note 29, at 291, is the ultimate problem of environmental law generally. The open-
ended nature of scientific investigation of environmental problems gives rise to conflicts within 
the scientific community itself concerning the causes, effects, and extent of environmental 
degradation. This, in turn, creates a regulatory dilemma: how far do you go in curtailing 
"lucrative economic activities on the basis of incomplete scientific evidence" of what may turn 
out to be irreversible damage to the environment. Id. (quoting Sand, Protecting the Ozone 
Layer: The Vienna Convention Is Adopted, ENVIRONMENT, June 1985, at 18, 40). In the face 
of this dilemma, then, provisions for reassessment and revision become essential to the efficacy 
of environmental regulation. 
66 See, e.g., Kindt & Menefee, supra note 29, at 293. 
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domestic political opposition to the regulation of ozone-depleting 
materials that, in turn, made the Montreal Protocol possible. 
As discussed above, mounting scientific evidence of substantial 
ozone depletion marshalled sufficient political support for the coop-
erative approach of the Vienna Convention. Until the Antarctic 
"ozone hole" was discovered, however, factions blocked efforts to 
establish a regulatory system. The critical juncture was reached 
upon pUblication of the "ozone hole" findings, which lent a sense of 
urgency to the problem, a perception that perhaps the Rubicon had 
been crossed. 67 Concurrently, news of the probable availability of 
CFC substitutes played an important role in generating the requisite 
domestic political support for the substantive provisions of the Mon-
treal Protocol. 68 This latter element is important in the field of en-
vironmental regulation. Where alternatives do not seem viable, re-
duction of existing pollutants is likely to disrupt existing economies 
and lifestyles. This alone could create strong resistance to reduction 
agreements. 
The absence of these factors in other trans boundary pollution 
situations may mean that the Montreal Protocol's availability as a 
prototype may be limited. Therefore, in seeking solutions to other 
multilateral environmental problems, additional guidance may be 
found in other approaches. In that regard, the United States-Canada 
Free Trade Agreement of 1988 unintentionally may have provided 
a very different model for environmental solutions. 
III. ACID RAIN AND THE UNITED STATES-CANADA FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENT OF 1988 
A. The Problem: Acid Rain 
Rainfall in the northeastern United States and southeastern re-
gions of Canada is increasingly acidic. 69 Emissions from industrial 
sources and vehicles contain sulphur dioxide (S02) and nitrogen ox-
ides (NxOy ). These sources are almost exclusively the cause of the 
problem. 70 Of these two sources, seventy-one percent of sulphur 
67 See supra notes 29-42 and accompanying text. 
68 See supra notes 43-49; see also Doolittle, supra note 36, at 429 n.180 (proposition that 
the availability of CFC substitutions transforms the ozone depletion issue to a problem capable 
of resolution with relative ease). 
69 Oppenheimer, Reducing Acid Rain in Eastern North America: The Scientific Basis for 
an Acid Rain Policy, 19 MICH. J. OF L. REFORM 989, 989 (1986). 
70 Steiner, supra note 57, at 5. For a more thorough discussion of acid rain, see id. at 5-
12. 
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dioxide emissions come from electricity-generating plants, most of 
which use coals as a fuel. 71 Electric utilities account for thirty-one 
percent of the nitrogen oxide emissions. 72 These oxides may fall 
directly to earth (after being emitted from the end-of-the-stack or 
the end-of-the-pipe) as dry deposition, or they may be chemically 
transformed as they travel through the atmosphere and mix with 
precipitation, thence falling to earth in the form of wet deposition 
or "acid rain. "73 
Scientists have been able to trace the source of oxides falling as 
acid rain in southeastern Canada and northeastern United States by 
factoring in the variables of air current, emission patterns, and 
unique trace elements from burning particular fuels (called "regional 
signatures") in the precipitation.74 Their studies indicate that a major 
source of acid rain in southeastern Canada and the northeastern 
United States are United States power plants located in the Mid-
west. 75 "Tall stacks," smokestacks that allow utilities and industries 
to burn inexpensive high sulphur coal without violating the United 
States Clean Air Act, facilitate oxide transport from the Midwest. 76 
Canada claims that one-half of the acid rain damage in its south-
eastern region is attributable to these Ohio Valley emissions. 77 
Acid rain is environmentally damaging. 78 Water bodies lose their 
pH balance. 79 As a result of watershed acidity, toxic metals enter 
into ground and surface water; aquatic life dies; nutrients dissipate; 
and fungi and bacteria in watershed soil may be destroyed. 80 Acid 
71 OF~'ICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ACID RAIN AND TRANSPORTED AIR POLLUTION: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 265-99 (1984), cited in Moller, The United States-Canadian 
Acid Rain Crisis: Proposal for an International Agreement, 36 UCLA L. REV. 1207, 1208 
n.5 (1989). 
72 Id. 
7S See Oppenheimer, supra note 69, at 990. 
7. See Steiner, supra note 57, at 7-10. 
76 Id. 
76 Id. at 17-19. See also Clean Air Act § 123, 42 U.S.C. § 7423 (1988). Tall stacks have 
enabled utilities and industries to avoid technical violation of the Clean Air Act because the 
pollutants they expel do not fall in the area surrounding the plants (where the compliance 
measurements are taken). Instead, these pollutants travel downwind to the northeast United 
States, as well as over the Canadian border. Congress attempted to correct this problem with 
its 1977 amendment to § 123 of the Clean Air Act. For a discussion of this amendment and 
the promulgated regulations thereunder, see Steiner, supra note 57, at 19-21. The amendment 
merely calls for a "good engineering practices" standard for measuring tall stacks, and EPA 
regulations have failed to clarify that standard. 
77 Carson, Environmental Protection, Unfair Competition and the U.S.-Canada Free 
Trade Discussions, 12 CANADA-U.S. L.J. 263, 266 (1987). 
7S See Steiner, supra note 57, at 5-12. 
79 Oppenheimer, supra note 69, at 990-92. 
80 Id. 
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rain also shortens the life span and growth rate of trees, reduces 
crop yields, and corrodes building materials. 81 It is also damaging to 
the human respiratory system. 82 
Ample evidence that United States Ohio Valley pollutants are the 
primary source of southeastern Canadian acid rain has been mount-
ing since the 1970s.83 That evidence inspired two agreements be-
tween the United States and Canada on the subject: the 1979 Joint 
Statement on Transboundary Air Quality84 and the 1980 Memoran-
dum of Intent Concerning Transboundary Air Pollution.85 These 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Moller, The United States-Canadian Acid Rain Crisis: Proposal for an International 
Agreement, 36 UCLA L. REV. 1207, 1212 (1989). 
84 See 1979 Joint Statement on Transboundary Air Quality Talks, reprinted in DEP'T ST. 
BULL., Nov. 26, 1979, at 26. This Joint Statement was largely the result of the efforts of the 
Bilateral Research Consultation Group on Long-Range Transport of Air Pollutants (LRTAP), 
which was set up in 1978. See Steiner, supra note 57, at 27. 
86 Memorandum of Intent Concerning Transboundary Air Pollution, Aug. 5, 1980, United 
States-Canada, 32 U.S.T. 2521, T.I.A.S. No. 9856 [hereinafter Memorandum of Intent]. The 
LRTAP also designed the Memorandum. See supra note 84. 
On the issue of transboundary air pollution, both countries are pltrties to the following 
multilateral agreements: the Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 
of 1979, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, and the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. See supra note 1. However, the United 
States refused to attend the Ottawa Conference, hosted by Canada, which drafted the 1984 
Declaration on Acid Rain. Signatories of the Declaration are deemed members of a "thirty 
percent club" in which the signatories, by common consensus, agreed to reduce their S02 
emissions to at least 30% of 1980 levels by 1993 and to reduce NxOy emissions as much as 
possible. For a discussion of the Declaration, see Steiner, supra note 57, at ~O. The United 
States was not a signatory of the Declaration. At the time the Reagan administration adopted 
a "more research-no action" policy but did agree to join Canada in further research into the 
problem. Id. at 29 n.128. 
On the issue oftransfrontier environmental problems, generally, between the two countries, 
the United States and Canada relationship can be traced as far back as the 1909 Boundary 
Water Treaty. Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, Jan. 11, 1909, United States-Great Britain, 
36 Stat. 2448, reprinted in 31 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 401 (1978). It dealt primarily with water 
quality, but also established a precedential approach that mandates against transboundary 
pollution between the two countries. See id. The Treaty also established the International 
Joint Commission (IJC), a permanent quasi-judicial commission to address environmental 
problems between the two countries. Id. at 403. It has been suggested that the IJC's juris-
diction be expanded. It could then act as a forum for resolution of the acid rain conflict. See 
Steiner, supra note 57, at 12, 13 n.51. The IJC did decide a landmark case in environmental 
law, the Trail Smelter case. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Canada), 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 
182 (1939) (interim decision), 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941) (final decision). That case marked 
the first time a tribunal had dealt with the liability of a country for its transboundary air 
pollution. The IJC decided that British Columbia was liable for damage from sulphur dioxide 
air pollution to property in Washington State. Id. For a discussion of the development of case 
law and customary law relative to transboundary pollution, see Steiner, supra note 57, at 12-
17; Note, Our Neighbor's Keeper? The United States and Canada: Coping With Transboun-
dary Air Pollution, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 159, 169-76 (1985). 
Unilaterally, of course, each country has its own legal regime for curtailing ambient air 
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agreements are analogous to the Vienna Convention.86 They evince 
a concern over the issue, and the Memorandum of Intent calls for a 
cooperative effort by the two countries to continue to study the issue 
and to share their respective research findings. 87 While recipients of 
the Ohio Valley acid rain pollutants on both sides of the border have 
pollution. Provisions of the United States Clean Air Act are found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 
(1982). Provisions of the Canadian Clean Air Act of 1971 are found at CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 
C-32 (1985). In Canada the jurisdiction of regulation is divided between the Canadian federal 
government and the provincial governments. [d. § 20. 
Under the Canadian Clean Air Act of 1971, the federal government may impose air quality 
standards only where life or health are at stake or to curtail transboundary (national or 
provincial) pollution. [d. §§ 8, 24. For power plant emissions it construes its authority nar-
rowly, as merely advisory. See H. LEE, N. FOSTER & E. PALSON, CANADIAN ELECTRICITY 
IMPORTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY, ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPLICATIONS 45 (Energy and Environmental Policy Center, John F. Kennedy School of 
Government). Pursuant to that authority, it has established advisory ambient air quality 
standards and a monitoring network to collect ambient air quality data. [d. at 46. The 
standards and data cover sulfur dioxide, ozone, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, and par-
ticulates, on a scale from "maximum desirable" (for example, 0.02 parts per million (ppm) for 
S02, permitting short periods of higher concentration) to "maximum acceptable," to "maximum 
tolerable." The comparable United States standard is 0.03 ppm, with an additional short-term 
allowance for S02. [d. at 47. However, since the short-term allowance for higher concentrations 
under Canadian law is 0.11 ppm for 24 hours and 0.34 ppm for one hour, compared with 0.14 
ppm for a 24-hour average and 0.5 ppm for a three-hour average, on balance the Canadian 
standards for S02 are more stringent. [d. The provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan have 
adopted the most stringent Canadian standards ("maximum desirable") while Ontario, Quebec, 
and New Brunswick enforce the "maximum acceptable" standards. [d. at 48. Across the 
board, these enforceable constraints are at least as stringent as those of the United States. 
[d. at 54. 
In addition, under the Canadian Acid Rain Program, the seven eastern provinces have 
committed themselves to reducing S02 to one-half of 1980 permissible levels by 1994. On a 
national average, electricity-generating facilities in the United States contribute significantly 
higher levels of S02 to the ambient air (68% in 1985, for example) than do their Canadian 
counterparts (28% in 1984). [d. at 47. On a national average non-ferrous smelting operations 
are the biggest S02 emission offenders in Canada. [d. at 48. Among the provinces, only 
Ontario and New Brunswick have appreciable S02 emissions from electricity-generating fa-
cilities. [d. In Ontario, for instance, 20% of its S02 emissions were attributable to Ontario 
Hydro in 1986. [d. at 49. Ontario Hydro's program to reduce these emissions, in order to 
comply with the 1994 levels required by the Canadian Acid Rain Program, include a mix of 
purchasing power from Hydro-Quebec, replacing coal generation with several small nuclear 
and hydro facilities, switching to lower sulfur coal, and end-of-the-stack technologies. [d. at 
50-54. It is important to point out that Ontario's emission standards apply to both new and 
old stationary sources while the counterpart standards under United States law cover only 
new stationary sources. Old United States plants are subject only to the more lenient State 
Implementation Plans. Clean Air Act §§ 110, 111, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410-7411 (1977). Under 
United States law, then, Ontario Hydro's coal-fired plants at issue here would not be covered 
by comparable standards. The example above is indicative of the evidence that, as to ambient 
air quality, Canadian law is at least as stringent as comparable United States law. 
86 See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text. 
87 See Moller, supra note 83, at 1211. 
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continued to push for stringent controls,88 they have not been able 
to garner sufficient political support in the United States for a bilat-
eral regulatory regime. More precisely, the domestic political forces 
of the coal lobby-with the blessings of the Reagan administration-
impeded all efforts during the 1980s to achieve a bilateral accord on 
regulation. 89 
During FTA negotiations, while Canada initiated proposals for an 
agreement on reduction of wet sulfate depositions, the Reagan ad-
ministration retreated to a wait-and-see haven. 9o Representative 
Dingell (D-Michigan), speaking in support of Midwest coal interests, 
opined that as to acid rain, "its causes and effects are at best at this 
time obscure, if not, in fact, unknown. "91 The use of scientific dis-
putes on environmental issues by political opponents of pollutant 
regulation is reminiscent of similar tactics employed in the debates 
during the Vienna Convention. 92 
Secretary Donald Hodel (Secretary of the Interior in the Reagan 
administration) went even further. In February 1987, he charged 
that Canadian initiatives on acid rain regulation during the negoti-
ations were motivated by an attempt to increase sales of Canadian 
88 While the FTA negotiations were going on, Senator Mitchell (D-Maine) and Senator 
Stafford (R-Vermont) each introduced stringent command and control legislation in Congress. 
During the same period Canada submitted its own proposal for bilateral accord for reduction 
of wet sulfate depositions. See Carson, supra note 77, at 265-67. 
89 It should be noted that during the decade of the 1980s, when negotiations on the FTA 
were underway, legally enforceable mechanisms were available that could have offered partial 
solutions to the acid rain problem. See supra note 85. Section 7415 of the United States Clean 
Air Act affords a foreign nation the right to affect the enforcement of provisions of the Act, 
and § 7423 seeks to curtail the "tall stack" problem. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7415, 7423 (1988). However, 
as construed by the EPA and the courts, these provisions have been ineffective. See, e.g., 
Thomas v. New York, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987). In 
Thomas, the appellate court refused to accept the EPA's acknowledgment of the transboun-
dary acid rain problem as sufficient to trigger the mandatory provisions of § 115, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7415, that a foreign nation be accorded rights under the Clean Air Act. For a discussion of 
both sections of the Act, see Moller, supra note 83, at 1211, 1218. 
00 Carson, supra note 77, at 263. It is typical of this "don't be precipitous" approach to rely 
on dispute within the scientific community on the issue to justify the position. A similar 
scenario was witnessed during debates on the proposals for regulation during the Vienna 
Convention. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. On the subject of acid rain there were 
divisions within the scientific community on the acid rain problem during FTA negotiations. 
See, e.g., Complexity, Unknowns Continue to Stir Debate over Source-Receptor Relationship 
in Acid Deposition, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1360 (1986). 
91 Carson, supra note 77, at 264. It should be noted that Representative Dingell more 
recently has lent his support to President Bush's draft clean air bill calling for a permanent 
cap on sulphur dioxide emissions. Weisskopf, Behind the Clean Air Bill: A Balancing of 
Interest, Wash. Post, July 30, 1989, at A16, col. 1. 
92 See supra note 90. 
296 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 18:279 
excess hydroelectricity to United States markets. 93 The final draft 
of the FTA skirted the acid rain regulation issue entirely, and the 
FTA section on energy is remarkable for its brevity.94 Sales of hy-
droelectricity were included, not as a trade-off for acid rain controls, 
but as an energy exchange: inexpensive Canadian hydropower to 
United States markets in exchange for Canadian access to Alaskan 
oil. 95 
Unlike proponents of ozone regulation prior to ratification of the 
Montreal Protocol, advocates of acid rain regulation during FTA 
negotiations could point neither to news of scientific findings with 
apocalyptic overtones, nor to published reports of available substi-
tutes for the polluting sources. The negotiators were unable to gen-
erate the requisite United States domestic political support to ov-
erride opposition of the United States coal lobby to bilateral acid 
rain regulation. Nor was it politically feasible to juxtapose acid rain 
and hydropower trade-offs explicitly within the purview of the FTA. 
Nevertheless, an interrelationship between acid rain abatement and 
the sale of Canadian hydroelectricity can be anticipated under im-
plementation of the FTA. This interrelationship will be discussed in 
subsequent sections of this Article. 96 
B. The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1988 
The United States and Canada have a checkered history of trade 
relations because each country periodically expresses its own pro-
tectionist sentiments. 97 The United States-Canada Free Trade 
Agreement seems to usher in a new era of bilateral agreement. This 
spirit of bilateralism was inspired primarily by the perception that 
it will facilitate the two countries' success in competing in an increas-
ingly aggressive global market. 98 The FTA was signed by Prime 
93 This position was disavowed by the Reagan administration. Carson, supra note 77, at 
264. 
M See FTA, supra note 11, § 305. 
95 Ganezer, The Proposed Canada-United States Free Trade Area: A Phoenix Arises, 5 
PAC. BASIN L.J. 132, 133 (1986). Canada will have access to up to 50 thousand barrels per 
day of Alaskan oil, but it must be transported from the lower 48 states. 
96 See infra notes 116-41 and accompanying text. 
97 For a thorough discussion of the alternating rhythms of protectionism in United States-
Canada trade relations, see MacDonald, An Overview of the Prospects for Sectoral Integration: 
The View from Canada, 10 CANADA-U.S. L.J. 3 (1985). 
98 Ganezer, supra note 95, at 132. The United States and Canada are the world's largest 
trading partners, and Canada is especially dependent on the United States for trade--over 
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Minister Brian Mulroney and President Ronald Reagan on January 
2, 1988. It became effective on January 1, 1989.99 
The FTA is designed to eliminate trade barriers in the form of 
tariffs and quotas and to encourage non-discriminatory trade prac-
75% of all Canadian exports go to United States markets. DEP'T ST. BULL., July 1988, at 24; 
3 ABA SEC. NAT. RESOURCES L., Winter 1989, at 4,35. 
99 FTA, supm note 11. The legal structure for ratification and implementation of trade 
agreements in the United States differs significantly from the Canadian legal structure. The 
process under United States law is set out in the Trade Act of 1974 as amended. 19 U.S.C. 
§§ 2101-2495 (1988). For an overview of the procedures as employed during FTA negotiations 
and ratification, see S. REP. No. 509, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2395. For discussions of the Canadian process, see Fry, The 
Role of State and Provincial Governments in Canada-U.S. Sectoral Integration, 10 CANADA-
U.S. L.J. 169 (1985); Quinn, Fedemlism and Foreign Economic Relations, 10 CANADA-U.S. 
L.J. 197 (1985); Steger, Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and the Omnibus Trade Bill, 2 
REV. INT'L Bus. 71, 72 (March 1988). 
Under United States law, § 612 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Act) expresses Congressional 
sentiment favoring a free trade agreement with Canada for the purpose of enhancing the 
economic stability of both countries. S. REP. No. 509, supm, at 3. Under § 102(b) of the Act, 
as amended, the President is authorized to enter into bilateral agreements for the purpose of 
reducing or eliminating trade barriers to products traded between the United States and 
other nations. Id. Subject to specific procedural requirements set forth in the Act, as amended 
by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 and the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 
these trade agreements may be expeditiously ratified under "fast-track" consideration. Id. 
Pursuant to these statutorily mandated procedures, the Reagan administration notified Con-
gress on December 10, 1985, of Canada's formal request to negotiate a free trade agreement. 
Id. at 4. "Fast-track" procedure requires that the Executive cannot proceed with negotiations 
if the request is disapproved within 60 session days from the Executive's notification. Id. A 
motion to disapprove before the Finance Committee of the Senate was defeated by a tie vote 
of 10-to-l0 on April 23, 1986; therefore, negotiations were initiated. Id. Opposition to nego-
tiations was attributed to congressional fear that it would not be adequately consulted during 
the negotiation process. Id. at 5. On October 3, 1987, the administration notified Congress of 
its intent to enter into a free trade agreement with Canada on January 2, 1988, upon successful 
culmination of the negotiations. Id. However, since the final text of the proposed agreement 
was not available until January 2, 1988, President Reagan was unable to fulfill his statutory 
obligation to consult fully with the congressional committee having jurisdiction over the various 
matters covered by the agreement. I d. Compensatory measures, in the form of an exchange 
ofletters between congressional leaders and Cabinet officers, permitted the process to continue 
within the spirit, if not the letter, of § 102(c). See id. at 6. As required by the Act, President 
Reagan submitted the final text of the agreement, along with the implementing legislation 
and other requisite documents, to Congress on July 25, 1988, where they were favorably 
reported, thus completing the "fast-track" procedure. See id. It should be noted that congres-
sional opposition during the process concerned, not the substance of the document, but fears 
that the President would breach his statutory duty to consult with Congress adequately 
during negotiations. Id. at 5. Both the United States procedural process and the political 
sentiment underlying it stand in stark contrast to concurrent process and sentiment in Canada 
during the same period of time. 
During the recent campaign for Prime Minister, opposition to the agreement from certain 
sectors of the Canadian population was well-publicized. Fundamentally, the opposition arose 
from the fear of a loss of Canadian political and economic independence. MacDonald, supm 
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tices between Canada and the United States. It also facilitates in-
vestments and financial services between the two countries. 
note 97, at 4. With the victory of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney came the apparent defeat 
of the opposition forces. But as an analysis of the jurisdictional issues pertaining to ratification 
and implementation of the agreement reveals, these forces may be down but not out. 
Conceptually, the Canadian process for ratification and implementation of agreements with 
foreign nations is less structured than that of the United States. The authority to negotiate 
and ratify these agreements is the sole prerogative of the Canadian federal government. 
Neither the federal Parliament nor the provincial governments plays a formal role in ratifi-
cation procedure. However, it is at the implementation level, where legislation is required to 
effect the provisions of an agreement, that the powers of sub-national government branches 
emerge. The apparent simplicity of this division of governmental authority belies a complexity 
of overlapping and competing jurisdiction. See H. LEE, N. FOSTER & E. PALSON, supra note 
85, at 44-45. 
By contrast, the parallel system under United States law is relatively straightforward. At 
the federal level, § 102(a) of the Trade Act of 1974 establishes the rule that agreements ratified 
under its provisions are not self-executing. This means that conflicting federal laws not 
superseded under the terms of an agreement's implementing legislation will prevail. Con-
versely, § 102(b) of the Act provides that the provisions of an agreement will prevail over any 
conflicting state laws. Further, the federal government may challenge inconsistent state laws 
through the judicial process. The Constitutional underpinnings of these provisions are to be 
found in articles I and VI. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, art. VI, cl. 2. 
As noted above, Canadian law concerning agreements with foreign countries operates under 
a system of decentralized federalism and overlapping jurisdiction. Quinn, supra, at 197. This 
system reflects a historically strong sense of regionalism in Canada, at the expense of its 
national identity. Fry, supra, at 176. So, for example, while Canadian law unequivocally 
provides that the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over inter-provincial motor 
vehicle traffic, it is the provinces that have exercised regulatory authority in this matter since 
1954. Quinn, supra, at 202. Most Canadian legal authorities agree that the Canadian Consti-
tution grants the federal government exclusive jurisdiction to make legally enforceable agree-
ments with foreign nations. That view was adopted by its Supreme Court in a 1984 case. [d. 
at 210. In another case,the Privy Council ruled that the power to implement these interna-
tional obligations is divided between the federal government and the provinces. This is 
consistent with the general division of subject-matter jurisdiction under the B.N.A. Act of 
1867 (known as the "Constitution Act"), a constitutional approach mandating that general 
grants of power to the federal government (for example, § 132 of the B.N.A. granting the 
federal government authority to make treaties) should be narrowly construed. [d. at 211. The 
provincial authority in this arena derives partially from the "property and civil rights" clause 
of the Constitution. This has been interpreted to include, among other things, provincial 
authority over land use affecting waterbodies, and provincial ownership of the beds of lakes 
and rivers. On the other hand, the federal government's jurisdictional authority includes, in 
addition to foreign relations, navigation, fisheries, works "for the advantage of Canada," and 
matters concerned with "peace, order and good government." With respect to water quality, 
the federal and provincial governments have concurrent jurisdiction. Thus, on this subject of 
water alone, it can be seen that three different sovereign scenarios are possible. It is clear 
that the issue of implementation of the agreement under Canadian law will revolve around 
the determination of SUbject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, a cursory examination of the 
division of jurisdiction between the two levels of government as it pertains to various subjects 
covered by the agreement may be in order. 
With regard to products seeking markets within provinces, provincial governments are 
permitted to impose a wide range of "non-tariff" measures to protect local industries. These 
measures include subsidies that favor local industries, and taxes and regulations that discrim-
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Consistent with article XXIV of the General Agreement of Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT),100 the FTA creates an area of free trade that 
eliminates certain trade barriers in three phases over a ten-year 
period. 101 Only those products that meet Rules of Origin require-
ments will be accorded FTA free trade treatment.102 Products from 
third countries shipped through one FTA party to the other in order 
to avoid tariffs are not accorded free trade status. However, prod-
ucts of either party that contain third country components signifi-
cantly changed in production will receive free trade status pursuant 
to the International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity De-
scription and Coding System.103 Liberalized customs procedures un-
der the Act are also designed to protect the free trade status of 
party products. 104 Customs fees will be eliminated by 1994.105 "Buy 
national" restrictions are eliminated in accordance with the GATT 
Government Procurement Code. 106 
By contrast with the Montreal Protocol, the FTA provides dispute 
resolution mechanisms. Title IV of the FTA provides for resolution 
of disputes arising under its terms. 107 When a dispute arises under 
inate against foreign producers and producers from other provinces. Quinn, supra, at 199. In 
the financial services sector, many provinces explicitly prohibit foreign-owned businesses from 
entry into their financial services market. Moreover, it has been asserted that these measures 
are specifically designed to curtail entry by United States firms. Id. at 204. Regarding 
agricultural products, provinces avail themselves of three legal techniques to protect local 
producers: subsidies for domestic produce, product and quality regulations that have the effect 
of discrimination against out-of-province produce, and agricultural marketing boards that have 
the authority to enact discriminatory distribution and marketing rules. Id. at 205. In the 
industrial sector, a wide range of support programs favor domestic manufacturers. These 
include direct subsidies, grants and loans, and special corporate income tax deductions and 
exemptions. Id. at 207. Finally, and of particular concern in this study, provincial governments 
pursue various policies to protect their natural resources industries, principally implemented 
through a variety of taxing techniques. Id. at 206. It remains to be seen whether these 
measures will be used to impede implementation of the FTA, and if so whether ongoing 
negotiations will successfully resolve the inherent conflict. 
100 General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Oct. 30, 1947, as amended, Basic 
Instruments and Selected Documents, vol. IV, 61 Stat. (pt. 5) A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 
U.N.T.S. 188. Ninety-four nations are currently members of the GAT!' trading system. See 
generally Comment, GATT-Legal Application of Safeguards in the Context of Regional Trade 
Arrangements and its Implications for the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 71 
MINN. L. REV. 1488, 1492-1500 (1989). 
101 See FTA, supra note 11, §§ 201-207. 
102 See id. § 202. 
103 See S. REP. No. 509, looth Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2395, 2407. 
104 See FTA, supra note 11, §§ 203, 204, 304. 
105 Id. § 204. 
106 See id. § 306. 
107 See id. §§ 401-410. 
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the terms of the FTA, application for resolution may be made to the 
Canada-United States Trade Commission (Commission). The Com-
mission is empaneled under the FTA and composed of Cabinet-level 
personnel. Each country must give notice and the opportunity for 
consultation to the other member country where existing or pro-
posed legislation or executive orders will affect implementation of 
the FTA. Either country may request consultations with the other 
member to resolve conflicts. If consultation fails to resolve any dis-
pute, either member may make application to the Commission re-
quiring it to convene within ten days and address the issue. The 
Commission may employ one of several vehicles for dispute resolu-
tion, including the service of an appointed mediator or expert advi-
sors to assist in consensus resolution. If no settlement is reached by 
this form of mediation, the Commission may make its own final 
decision. When the Commission fails to reach a consensus decision, 
a member country may withdraw from the offending country benefits 
equivalent to those at issue in the dispute. 
Each country will continue to enforce its own anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty laws, which protect the domestic economy from 
foreign unfair trade practices, during a seven-year period or until a 
bilateral approach is developed and agreed upon. 108 If there is no 
agreement on the bilateral approach in seven years, either country 
may terminate the Agreement. During that seven-year period, how-
ever, domestic judicial review will not be available. Final orders of 
the Department of Commerce or the International Trade Commis-
sion in the United States, and the Department of National Revenue 
or the Canadian Import Tribunal in Canada, must be reviewed by a 
bilateral panel that will have exclusive jurisdiction to determine 
whether the respective agency's decision complied with its domestic 
law under the standards of review applicable to the case. 109 A panel 
will be convened at the request of either country, and an aggrieved 
private citizen of either country can compel its government to make 
a request. In addition, where either government proposes modifi-
cation of its existing anti-dumping or countervailing duty laws, the 
other member country must be named in the legislation and given 
notification and the opportunity to engage in consultation. Disputes 
that cannot be resolved through the consultation process may be 
referred to a binational panel for its recommendations. If this mech-
anism fails to achieve a mutually agreed-upon resolution, the ag-
lOB For a discussion of these duty laws, see Steger, supm note 99, at 79. 
109 Id. at 83-84. 
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grieved country may enact equivalent legislation or terminate the 
FTA.110 
The FTA deals individually with specific sectors of trade covered 
by the Agreement. 111 Section 305 of the Agreement deals with en-
ergy trade. The FTA seeks to improve predictable development of 
bilateral trade in energy products by reducing government interfer-
ence in energy trade between the parties. 112 The Agreement ex-
plicitly covers trade in coal, natural gas, oil, uranium, and electricity. 
It prohibits trade restrictions except where necessary to stabilize 
domestic markets, or prevent domestic shortages or depletion of an 
energy resource. Additional provisions require that the exceptions 
not be imposed so as to disrupt the energy flow between the two 
countries. These terms are intended to meet the dual goals of energy 
security and market predictability for both Canada, as net supplier, 
and the United States, as net importer, in energy trade. 113 
In addition, annexed to the FTA are terms for mandatory changes 
in existing domestic statutes and regulations that are designed to 
conform domestic law to the FTA's terms. Among these are an 
exemption for the United States from Canada's least-cost alternative 
test for the export of electricity and a guarantee of non-discrimina-
tory treatment for British Columbia Hydro's access to the California 
electricity market. 114 Thus, the FTA is designed to encourage trade 
in energy products including hydroelectricity. 
Opposition within the United States to the sale of Canadian hy-
droelectricity to United States markets has come primarily from 
those states that rely on the coal industry as a major employer and 
as a major supplier of energy to industrial and utility facilities: 
Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and West Vir-
ginia. 115 This region obviously fears displacement of coal as an energy 
source (especially the high-sulphur coal found in the eastern states) 
by the inherently cheaper and more environmentally benign hydroe-
lectricity. Their fears may be well-grounded. The next section of this 
Article identifies the forces that will impel increased United States 
imports of Canadian hydroelectricity, and it indicates how, without 
addressing the acid rain problem explicitly, the FTA may serve to 
ameliorate the problem through the play of market forces. 
110 I d. at 84. 
111 FTA, supra note 11, title III. 
112 See Steger, supra note 99, at 77-78. 
113 Id. 
114 S. REP. No. 509, supra note 99, at 63-64. 
115 See Carson, supra note 77, at 264. 
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IV. THE INTERNATIONALSHIP OF UNITED STATES ENERGY 
REQUIREMENTS, CANADIAN HYDROELECTRICITY, AND THE ACID 
RAIN PROBLEM 
A. United States Energy Requirements 
United States energy needs have been volatile in recent decades. 
They grew exponentially during the 1960s and then plummeted to 
almost one-half the 1960s rate during the 1970s as prices rose and 
the economy slowed.1I6 During the first half of the 1980s, demand 
began to rise again gradually, at the rate of 1.9% per year. Experts 
were then predicting a mere 2%-per-year increase to the end of the 
century.ll7 But in 1987-1988, the rate jumped to 4.5% per year, and 
that trend continues unabated,118 United States utility companies 
realize they are confronted by difficult choices in meeting new fore-
casts for United States energy consumption to the end of the cen-
tury.1I9 Some prospects for expanding generating capacity are more 
promising than others. Co-generation and independent producer 
sources offer a partial solution. Nuclear power faces onerous eco-
nomic and public perception obstacles. 120 Investment in large-scale 
traditional plants entails the risk of overbuilding. Further, petroleum 
fuel sources for these plants, and the environmental regulatory re-
gimes that accompany them, are expensive, while the cheaper fuel 
source, coal, is environmentally destructive. 121 
The cheapest and most widely used renewable power source is 
hydropower. Large hydroelectricity plants currently generate elec-
tricity at less than a half cent per kilowatt hour. 122 All available sites 
in the United States for large hydro projects have already been 
developed. Further, experts predict that United States hydro pro-
duction may decline in the next three years as fifty-year federal 
licenses for many small and medium-sized generators expire, and 
operators decline to endure the relic en sing process. 123 Only marginal 
expansion in domestic hydroelectric power can be anticipated, and 
it will take the form of adding or refurbishing turbines in existing 
116 Power to Burn, Wash. Post, July 31, 1989, at A14, col. 1. 
117 [d. 
118 See id. 
119 Lippman, The Demand/or Electricity, Wash. Post, June 18, 1989, at A18, col. 5. 
120 Cook, Nuclear Follies, FORBES, Feb. 11, 1985, at 82. 
121 See Power to Burn, supra note 116, at A18, col. 6. 
122 Rader, Power Forecast: Sunny, Breezy, Wet, Wash. Post, July 23, 1989, at D3, col. 5. 
123 Lippman, Energy Dept. to Promote Conservation, New Fuels, Wash. Post, Jan. 27, 
1990, at A3, col. 5. 
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plants, retrofitting generating capacity on flood-control dams, or 
adding pumped hydro storage capacity to upper reservoirs to meet 
peak period demand. 124 Most additional hydroelectric power will, 
therefore, come from Canadian sources. 
B. Importing Canadian Hydroelectricity 
Since 1970, sales of Canadian hydroelectricity to United States 
markets have multiplied. In 1970, Canadian exports of hydropower 
to the United States stood at 2.4 million megawatt hours (mwh); by 
1984, that figure had grown to 39.5 million mwh. 125 In 1986, the total 
amount was 35,300 gigawatt hours (GWH) , for which the United 
States paid $768 million (in United States dollars, or 30 millslkwh in 
Canadian dollars).126 
Prices for Canadian hydroelectricity are set by the United States 
markets into which they are sold. Both before and after ratification 
of the FTA, contracts for Canadian hydro established prices as a 
percentage (usually eighty percent) of the cost to produce the same 
amount of power in the United States. 127 This latter figure is usually 
computed as the "avoided cost" of having to construct a new coal 
facility in the United States. 128 So, for example, a unit of power that 
cost ten cents to produce in Canada, and a dollar to produce in a 
new coal facility in the United States, might sell for eighty cents 
under these contracts. 129 This "split-the-profits," or "split-the-sav-
ings," arrangement is obviously advantageous to both countries. 130 
In 1986, it is estimated that the United States saved up to $275 
million under this avoided cost arrangement. 131 
This cost-of-production differential is created principally because 
the production of hydroelectricity entails minimal fuel costS. 132 Ad-
ditional savings to purchasers accrue from the fact that construction 
of most Canadian hydroelectricity facilities is funded by the Canadian 
government. 133 
124 See Rader, supra note 122. 
125 Carson, supra note 77, at 267. 
126 H. LEE, N. FOSTER & E. PARSON, supra note 85, at 32. The Department of Energy 
reports that there has been no change in that price during the initial post-FTA period-1989. 
Telephone interview with Department of Energy official (Apr. 17, 1990). 
127 See Carson, supra note 77, at 267. 
128 See H. LEE, N. FOSTER & E. PARSON, supra note 85, at 30. 
129 Carson, supra note 77, at 284. 
130 See id. 
131 H. LEE, N. FOSTER & E. PARSON, supra note 85, at 70. 
132 Carson, supra note 77, at 267. 
133 rd. 
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Substantial increase in Canadian exports of hydroelectricity dur-
ing the last two decades was attributable to the fact that Canadians, 
like their United States counterparts, overestimated domestic de-
mand and, therefore, overbuilt their hydro capacity in the 1970s.134 
This construction resulted in excess capacity that has been exported 
to United States utilities. Because of the limitations of transmission 
technology, the United States is the only viable market for Canadian 
excess hydro capacity. 135 
Government officials forecast that Canadian exports of hydroelec-
tricity will exceed 63,000 GWH by 1995. This represents a thirty-
six percent increase within a decade. 136 To date, to the extent that 
the purchase of Canadian hydropower has displaced a pre-existing 
source of United States energy, it has replaced primarily imported 
oil, not domestic coal. In the current United States political climate, 
any mechanism that can reduce the resurgent United States depen-
dence on oil imports without incurring other social costs is bound to 
receive almost unanimous acclaim domestically. If, however, the 
incipient Clean Air legislation, as enacted, significantly ratchets 
down controls on fossil fuel emissions, one result could be an appre-
ciable rise in the cost of coal as an energy source. This, in turn, 
would widen the price discrepancy between domestic coal, as a power 
source, and imported hydropower, making the latter an attractive 
alternative to coal. 137 Even without the additional costs associated 
with Clean Air Act amendments, Canadian hydro represents a cost-
effective alternative to coal. Current estimates for future coal ca-
pacity are between forty-one and sixty-four millslkwh in New Eng-
land, between twenty-three and fifty-three millslkwh for the upper 
Midwest, and between thirty-seven and sixty-three millslkwh on the 
West Coast. 138 Cost of compliance under the Clean Air Act amend-
ments could lower the estimates and raise the amount of Canadian 
hydroelectric imports above the amount currently predicted. 139 
134 See id. 
135 McLachlan, Apuzzo & Kerr, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: A Canadian 
Perspective, 22 J. WORLD TRADE 9, 25 (1988). 
136 H. LEE, N. FOSTER & E. PARSON, supra note 85, at 3; see McLachlan, Apuzzo & Kerr, 
supra note 135, at 6-14 (discussing the various types of contractual arrangements under which 
Canadian hydropower is sold). 
137 See Carson, supra note 77, at 268. 
138 H. LEE, N. FOSTER & E. PARSON, supra note 85, at 75. 
139 For a complete discussion of the concerns raised by spokesmen of the coal lobby regarding 
substantial imports of Canadian hydroelectricity, see id. at 15-62. Basically, the coal lobby 
argues that Canadian hydroelectricity may be unreliable, that it is unfairly subsidized, and 
that it is subject to minimal Canadian environmental regulation. Id. The Lee, Foster, and 
Parson study refutes these allegations. Id. 
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There is substantial evidence that imports of Canadian hydroelec-
tricity have been beneficial to United States consumers. Commen-
tators describing the net economic benefit that the imports have 
provided to United States consumers have shown that United States 
consumers saved between $105 million and $137 million in 1986 for 
electricity generated by hydropower imports under interruptible 
power contracts. 140 They have also shown that United States utilities 
saved between $50 million and $275 million in 1986, under long term 
contracts.141 These calculations present a convincing case that hy-
droelectric imports from Canada confer a substantial economic ben-
efit on United States consumers. No attempt has been made to 
calculate the concurrent benefits to the United States environment 
that accrue from these imports. 
It is clear, however, that sales of Canadian hydropower to United 
States markets also confer some environmental benefits on the 
United States. These benefits include the avoidance of resource 
depletion (to the extent that domestic resources would be consumed 
to generate electricity as a replacement for the imports), and the 
reduction of pollutants associated with the entire fuel cycles of do-
mestic generation of electric power from various energy sources. In 
fact, to the extent that hydropower purchased from Canada confers 
this environmental benefit, it can be said that imports of Canadian 
power permit the United States to export some of its environmental 
problems. To that extent, the Canadian environment foots the bill 
for the conservation and protection of the United States environ-
ment. How high an environmental price Canadians are willing to pay 
remains to be seen as they face the prospects of expanding hydro 
facilities to accommodate an expanding United States market in 
future decades. 142 
As we have seen, imports of hydroelectricity from the excess 
capacity of existing Canadian hydro facilities have conferred signif-
icant economic and environmental benefits upon the United States. 
Similarly, sales of Canadian hydropower to the United States have 
offered environmental and economic advantages to Canada. Insofar 
as hydroelectricity displaces fossil fuel generation of electricity in 
the United States, it also reduces emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitro-
gen oxides, and particulates, and these reductions help to alleviate 
acid rain assaults upon the Canadian environment. Exports to the 
140 [d. at 66-67, table 3. 
141 [d. at 70-72. 
142 See infra note 159 and accompanying text. 
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United States, in general, along with exports of excess hydroelec-
tricity, in particular, have been vitally important to the Canadian 
economy. Exports to the United States constituted a primary mo-
tivation for Canada's ratification of the FTA. Canada's desire to play 
a competitive role in the global economic arena,143 its dependence on 
exports to United States markets as an indispensable part of its 
foreign trade policy,144 and its perception that a new wave of United 
States protectionism was imminent145 all contributed to the Mulroney 
administration's decision to embark upon the FTA negotiation pro-
cess. As the forecasts indicate, Canada can expect to enjoy increas-
ingly appreciable revenues from the sale of hydroelectricity to 
United States markets under the provisions of the FTA.146 While it 
is in Canada's best interests to have a market for its surplus hy-
droelectricity, it is not clear to what extent Canada will perceive it 
to be in its best interest to expand its capacity in order to accom-
modate the ever-increasing energy demands of the United States. 147 
In addition to the environmental/economic policy choices, Cana-
dians will have to make choices concerning land use. There is a 
growing perception in the United States that its voracious appetite 
143 See Quinn, Federalism and Foreign Economic Relations, 10 CANADA-U.S. L.J. 197, 
197 (1985). 
144 See Watkins, The Case Against United States-Canada Free Trade, 10 CANADA-U.S. 
L.J. 89, 90 (1985). 
145 I d. at 89. 
146 See H. LEE, N. FOSTER & E. PARSON, supra note 85, at 74, 78-79. 
147 The requisite expansion of transmission line capacity alone presents certain problems 
and hazards. Transmission line capacity is already filled. Additional aboveground transmission 
lines require land, and this requirement raises significant political, environmental, and health 
concerns. [d. at 76. The cost of equivalent underground transmission line construction is, 
however, five to seven times more expensive than aboveground construction. [d. Moreover, 
transmission lines traverse areas not served by the energy they transport. [d. Therefore, 
local opposition on land use and environmental grounds is inevitable. In addition, because of 
the intensive capital investment necessary for transmission line construction, the facilities 
require "wheeling" and, therefore, some guarantee of equal access to intervening transmission 
facilities across national and state lines. "Wheeling" is the transportation of electricity from 
one facility to another that requires access to the electricity lines owned by a third facility. J. 
TOMAIN, J. HICHEY, & S. HOLLIS, ENERGY LAW AND POLICY 472 (1989). No attempt was 
made to deal with these crucial issues under the provisions of the FTA. See McLachlan, 
Apuzzo & Kerr, supra note 135, at 25. The only specific provision in the FTA relevant to the 
transmission problem was one that provided British Columbia Hydro with equal access to the 
Bonneville tie, but it did not prevent intervening state facilities from refusing to "wheel." [d. 
Thus, all Canadian suppliers of hydroelectricity are placed in an untenable position regarding 
long-term investments in additional transmission capacity. This substantial hazard to infra-
structure investment, the risk of an inability to reach targeted United States markets, is not 
the only impediment to expansion of Canadian hydroelectric capacity for the purpose of serving 
United States needs. Rather it is merely symptomatic of larger resource and environmental 
issues also studiously avoided by the FTA. 
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for energy might be met by a menu of unlimited Canadian natural 
resources. So, for example, in response to the coal lobby's opposition 
to energy supplied by Canadian hydroelectric capacity, a study by 
Lee, Foster, and Parson comments, "[I]f the Canadian governments 
wish to consume their resources in order that United States house-
holds can enjoy lower-cost power, United States industries can re-
duce their electric bills and thus increase their competitiveness, and 
United States utilities can reduce their emissions of sulfur, particu-
lates and NOx while conserving capital ... should the United States 
object?"148 Relative to the energy resource alone, that study points 
out that Canada contains approximately twenty percent of the 
world's fresh water within rivers containing approximately ten per-
cent of the total flow of the world's waterways.149 Further, these 
rivers drain primarily into the north, an area that contains heretofore 
untapped sources of energy in unpopulated areas. 150 These areas are, 
thus, relatively unburdened by competing claims for the use of the 
resources and surrounding environment. 
Statistics describing undeveloped hydropower resources as well 
as the description of even one existing hydropower complex-Hydro-
Quebec's LG2 built in 1979-lends credence to the perception that 
Canada's hydroelectric resources are virtually unlimited. 151 From 
that vantage point it is easy to fall prey to the free trade doctrine 
that posits efficiency as the premier value. That doctrine has been 
espoused by both the Reagan and Bush administrations on the south 
side of the border. 152 The doctrine's perceived advantages of ex-
panding productivity and investment, and improving economic effi-
ciencies, are buttressed by substantial evidence that the flow of 
Canadian hydroelectricity under the FTA has been a net benefit to 
the United States. Similarly, on the north side of the border, pro-
ponents of the free trade doctrine can point with assurance to its 
indubitable contributions to Canada's export-driven economy. 153 The 
current energetic competition for market share among the provinces, 
dubbed "the civil war for foreign money, "154 reinforces the notion 
148 H. LEE, N. FOSTER & E. PARSON, supra note 85, at 28. 
149 Id. at 1-2 (citing ENVIRONMENT CANADA, CANADA WATER YEARBOOK 1977-78, at 53 
(1979». 
150 Id. 
151 See J. GARREAU, THE NINE NATIONS OF NORTH AMERICA 362-65 (1981). 
152 See Merkin, An Overview of the Prospects of Sectoral Integration: The View from the 
United States, 10 CANADA-U.S. L.J. 13, 13 (1985) (Reagan); Rowan, President Vows to Resist 
Calls for Managed Trade, Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 1990, at D1, col. 5 (Bush). 
153 Quinn, supra note 143, at 197. 
154 Fry, supra note 99, at 175. 
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that the economic attributes of free trade are of preeminent concern. 
However, as was mentioned in a previous section of this paper, this 
conventional economic wisdom155 is not without its detractors. 
Critics would argue that an efficient reallocation of resources, 156 
in solely economic terms, is merely the dominant priority of an 
industrial, political elite. 157 As Canada considers other impacts con-
sequent to any decision to expand its hydroelectric capacity appre-
ciably, these critics may playa pivotal role. 158 In the area of policy 
choices concerning environmental consequences of hydroelectric re-
sources development and deployment, a policy choice conflict is im-
minent and apparent. 159 
The FTA, by its terms, made no effort to grapple with environ-
mental problems emanating from projected expansion of Canadian 
hydroelectric capacity. The 1985 Report of the Royal Commission 
on the Economic Union and Development Prospects in Canada, 
which was published during negotiations leading to ratification of 
the FTA, states-with more hope than assurance-that there is "no 
ultimate conflict between economic development and the preserva-
tion and enhancement of a healthy environment and a sustainable 
156 Hunter, The Comparative Effects of Environmental Legislation in a North American 
Free Trade Area, 12 CANADA-U.S. L.J. 271, 272 (1987). 
156 Thompson, Reducing Barriers to Trade in Nontraded Goods and Services, 10 CANADA-
U.S. L.J. 35, 36 (1985). 
157 See Watkins, supra note 144, at 92. 
158 Political economists have argued that free trade between a predominantly natural 
resource economy (like Canada) and a predominantly industrial economy (like the United 
States) ultimately favors the industrial economy at the expense of the "hinterland" economy. 
This is so because the motivation of the hinterland to secure a market for its resources has 
the cumulative effect of, and tends to entrench the hinterland in, maintaining the hinterland's 
dependent position as a resource supplier. Any resolve to create a self-sufficient domestic 
economy through its own industrial development is diminished by this market-driven pro-
pensity. See id. at 92-95. 
159 Next year, Hydro-Quebec commences its Great Whale River project, which is a part of 
a plan to expand its hydroelectric facilities in the James Bay area. The project is designed to 
meet its burgeoning contractual requirements to accommodate United States energy needs in 
the northeastern United States. Existing facilities in the James Bay area already have flooded 
thousands of square miles of Cree Indian lands and destroyed natural bottomland flora and 
animals, especially caribou. The new project will not only eliminate additional Cree lands, but 
will also destroy habitat and breeding grounds of a wide variety of species, including fresh-
water seals, beluga whales, osprey, and bears. While the Cree and the Inuit were parties to 
a land claims settlement in 1975, which permitted Hydro-Quebec to develop the region for 
hydro capacity, these two groups, along with supporters from environmental organizations, 
have begun to rally opposition to the new project on both sides of the border. Estimates 
indicate that, if completed, the Great Whale River project will supply one-fourth of North 
America's hydroelectricity. Claiborne, Canadian Indians Battle Massive Hydro Project, 
Wash. Post, Apr. 3, 1990, at A12, col. 1. 
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resource base. "160 Thereupon, the Commission promulgated its "pol-
icy" that environmental concerns and economic growth were not 
incompatible. 161 While this approach is surely laudable, it offers little 
guidance in fashioning specific programs where real conflicts between 
development and the environment may arise. 162 
The emergence of competing claims to resource use and the en-
vironmental concerns of resource protection, in opposition to the 
economic momentum favoring expansion of Canadian hydroelectric 
capacity to serve United States energy needs, may in time be char-
acterized as an issue over sovereignty, the recurring Canadian fear 
that economic ties with the United States will lead to a loss of 
political independence on policy issues that affect the United 
States. 163 
This underlying ambivalence toward trade with the United 
Statesl64-the appeal of United States markets juxtaposed against 
the threat of United States domination-will take the form of a 
heartland-hinterland struggle between Ottawa and the provinces. 165 
The water-rich provinces may view themselves as being situated at 
the wrong end of the political-economic food chain. In the ensuing 
scenario, the federal capital, the hub of the country's manufacturing 
and financial interests, will continue to push for a broader trade 
arrangement. 166 With regard to trade in hydroelectricity, as energy 
requirements of the United States encourage a substantial expansion 
of Canadian hydroelectric capacity, the water-rich provinces may 
view with alarm the proposed depletion and despoiling of their lim-
ited natural resources. It is fair to say that they will not acquiesce 
in the face of market and federal pressures. They have at their 
disposal real power of their own. They command a significant share 
of the legislative power under Canada's decentralized federalism. 167 
In addition, the federal parties themselves are provincially based. 168 
In summary, the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement is 
a conservative mechanism for improving trade relations between the 
160 Hunter, supra note 155, at 271. 
161 Id. 
162 See H. LEE, N. FOSTER & E. PARSON, supra note 85, at 57. 
163 MacDonald, An Overview of Prospects for Sectoral Integration: The View from Canada, 
10 CANADA-U.S. L.J. 3, 7 (1985). 
164 Id. at 4. 
165 Fry, supra note 99, at 177. 
166 Moull, Natural Resources and Canadian Federalism: Reflections on a Turbulent De-
cade, 25 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 423 (1987). 
167 Quinn, supra note 143, at 198. 
168 Fry, supra note 99, at 177. 
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two countries. Given the history of retaliatory protectionist policies 
between the United States and Canada, the FTA represents a sig-
nificant step toward freer and more predictable trade relations. An-
alysts on both sides of the border hope that the Agreement also will 
ultimately facilitate mutually advantageous efficiencies within both 
economies, and that these will improve their respective positions in 
an increasingly competitive global market. 
In the energy sector, Canadian supply of hydroelectricity to 
United States markets will increase under the auspices of the FTA. 
This is so because the bilateral trade in hydroelectricity serves the 
dual purpose of providing Canada with a profitable, accessible mar-
ket for its excess production of electricity while simultaneously pro-
viding the United States with a pre-existing and available source of 
low-cost electricity to serve its expanding energy requirements. 
Nevertheless, it should not be supposed that these market dynam-
ics will result in an indefinite expansion of hydroelectric trade. Lim-
itations eventually will be imposed by forces emanating from within 
Canadian society. In spite of some regional and industry-specific 
forces within the United States that oppose importation of Canadian 
hydropower, the United States will not curtail expansion of the 
hydroelectric trade because it affords the national economy a supply 
of energy that is inherently and significantly inexpensive, both eco-
nomically and environmentally. Because Canadians are dependent 
upon United States markets for sales of their excess hydro capacity, 
they will continue to set prices so as to undercut United States 
domestic alternatives to Canadian hydroelectricity. 169 
On the other hand, as Canadians contemplate development of 
additional hydroelectric facilities and transmission capacity to feed 
the ever-growing United States appetite for energy, opposing forces 
will continue to emerge. Within the water-rich provinces, competing 
claims to hydro-related resources and environmentalists' interests, 
and traditional fears of United States imperialism will compel the 
implementation of policies limiting expansion of hydro capacity. They 
ultimately will serve to cap the exportation of hydroelectricity to 
United States markets. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that Canadian hydroelectricity will 
displace electricity generated by United States fossil fuel energy, it 
will serve the important environmental goal of reducing emissions 
that contribute to acid rain on both sides of the border. Thus, while 
domestic politics within the United States have precluded bilateral 
169 H. LEE, N. FOSTER & E. PARSON, supra note 85, at 18. 
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agreement on acid rain regulation, the play of market forces, under 
the auspices of the FTA, will act as a partial surrogate for "hard 
law" regulation. 
C. A Perspective on Canada's Policy Trade-Oiis 
As we have seen, expanding hydro production provides a distinct 
economic advantage to an export-dependent economy like Canada's. 
Expanding sales of hydropower to United States markets also prom-
ises an environmental benefit, insofar as Canadian hydropower 
serves to displace energy generated from existing facilities in the 
United States Midwest that contribute substantially to the Canadian 
acid rain problem. But, as discussed above, hydro production is not 
environmentally benign. It precludes alternate uses of vast tracts of 
land that must be flooded to develop the facilities. It also destroys 
existing ecosystems and native habitat on the flooded land. 
One method that may be helpful in measuring the real costs and 
benefits of development, in order to clarify the policy choices of 
expanding hydroelectric capacity, has been suggested by, among 
others, the World Resources Institute (WRI). Under traditional 
Keynsian accounting procedures of measuring a nation's economic 
well-being, gross national product (GNP), and "national income," 
natural resource deployment is treated as current income. This sys-
tem, employed by all developed nations for macroeconomic growth, 
completely ignores the depletion and ecological destruction of natural 
resources associated with apparent economic growth. As WRI points 
out, the natural environment is, among other things, the resource 
pool from which all economic activity arises. Therefore, natural re-
sources should be treated as productive tangible assets in national 
accounting procedures. Accordingly, the consumption or destruction 
of natural resources should be depreciated and deducted from the 
GNP.170 With regard to the expansion of hydroelectric capacity in 
Canada, for example, account should be made for the loss of millions 
of acres of land, timber, and habitat displaced by reservoirs associ-
ated with the construction of hydroelectric facilities. So, too, should 
these considerations be factored into macroeconomic projections of 
cost per unit of power produced. 
While these accounting procedures would lend clarity to calcula-
tions concerning the actual cost of hydroelectric expansion, the policy 
choices will still have to be made. In that regard, non-economic 
170 See Repetto, No Accounting for Pollution, Wash. Post, May 28, 1989, at B6, cols. 3-6. 
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policies as well as cost consideration will be brought to bear. For 
example, while development of additional hydroelectric facilities may 
proceed apace in some unpopulated, rugged areas that are part of 
the "Canadian Shield," there is already growing political opposition 
to expanding capacity, not only in Cree Territory in Quebec, but also 
in the province of British Columbia, where most suitable locations 
for additional facilities are located within arable valleys.171 There, 
competing claims to the resources may block or inhibit future de-
velopment of hydroelectricity beyond the amount needed to serve 
local markets. 
V. THE USE OF FREE TRADE MECHANISMS AS SUBSTITUTES FOR 
REGULATION OF TRANS BOUNDARY POLLUTION 
The problem of the transmission of acid rain pollutants from the 
United States to Canada illustrates the dilemma over management 
of resources held in common that Hardin characterized as the "Trag-
edy of the Commons."172 Hardin explained how "common-
property"173 resource degradation occurs, by employing a hypothet-
ical involving herdsmen and an open pasture. 174 As each herdsman 
171 See H. LEE, N. FOSTER & E. PARSON, supra note 85, at 57. 
172 See Hardin, supra note 5. 
173 Berkes, Feeny, McCay & Ackerson, The Benefit of the Commons, NATURE, July 13, 
1989, at 91. 
174 The text of the hypothetical is as follows: 
The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all. It 
is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on 
the commons. Such an arrangement may work satisfactorily for centuries because 
tribal wars, poaching and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below 
the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that 
is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this 
point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy. 
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or 
implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me of adding one 
more animal to my herd?" This utility has one negative and one positive component. 
1. The positive component is a function of an increment of one animal. Since the 
herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive 
utility is nearly + 1. 
2. The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by 
one more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the 
herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decisionmaking herdsman is only a 
fraction of -1. 
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes 
that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. 
And another; and another. . . . But this is the conclusion reached by each and every 
rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked 
into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit-in a world that is 
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pursued his self-interest by increasing the size of his own herd, the 
carrying capacity of the pasture was finally exceeded and the pas-
ture-the commons-was destroyed by over-grazing. As Hardin 
pointed out, where the problem is one of pollution, the situation is 
somewhat reversed. 175 
In the case of trans boundary acid rain, for example, Midwest 
utilities and industries that burn fossil fuels (and in particular, high 
sulphur coal) were faced with the necessity of complying with the 
United States Clean Air Act. Rather than investing in expensive 
pollution-abating technologies, they found it to be in their best in-
terests (cheaper and, therefore, more profitable) to construct tall 
stacks that propelled emissions into the atmosphere, where they 
were carried away from the immediate vicinity and-there by-
avoided detection by governmental monitors.176 
The result, acid rain in southeastern Canada and the northeastern 
United States, was thus a problem of "externalities."l77 Like the 
herdsman whose additional cattle are a "positive component"178 to 
his profit but a "negative component"179 to the commons of the pas-
ture, the tall stacks had the profitable effect (positive component) of 
permitting the Midwest facilities to export the expense-inducing 
emissions to the commons of the atmosphere, and thence, to the 
ecosystems upon which they eventually fell (the negative compo-
nent).180 
Hardin averred that, as to the commons of air and water (where 
privatization is impossible), the only effective devices for protecting 
them from this degradation are coercive laws or taxing techniques 
that "make it cheaper for the polluter to treat his pollutants than to 
limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own 
best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in 
a commons brings ruin to all. 
Hardin, supra note 5, at 1244. 
176 "Here it is not a question of taking something out of the commons, but of putting 
something in .... " Id. at 1245. 
176 See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text. 
177 Economists dub those effects that are not directly involved in the production or use of 
a commodity (private costs), "externalities." See R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 225 
(3d ed. 1972). 
178 See Hardin, supra note 5, at 1244. 
179 Id. 
180 Hardin described this phenomenon when he stated, "The rational man finds that his 
share of the cost of the wastes he discharges into the commons is less than the cost of purifying 
his wastes before releasing them." I d. at 5. The situation is analogous to the model known as 
the "prisoner's dilemma," which describes the factors that influence decisionmaking. See, e.g., 
GOETZ, LAW AND ECONOMICS 8-18 (1982). 
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discharge them untreated. "181 As Hahn and Richards have pointed 
out, domestic laws alone have been inadequate to deal with trans-
boundary pollution and the degradation of the global commons. This 
inadequacy has inspired the "internationalization" of environmental 
laws. 182 However, some analysts have argued that privatization and 
governmental regulation are not the only effective techniques for 
averting commons degradation. 
One proposed alternative is that of communality, where the users 
of the commons employ self-regulating techniques. 183 As advocates 
of this approach have indicated, communality works when historical 
and cultural perceptions encourage resource management of a com-
mons through social pressure and a spirit of cooperation. 184 
Another approach that has been espoused is inspired by the in-
sights of Ronald Coase. 185 Coase argued that legal imposition of 
compensatory liability on the polluter was not the most efficacious 
solution to the problem. Rather, he said, in the absence of high 
transaction costs (the costs entailed in consummating a business 
transaction), the preferred, most efficient solution is to permit the 
offending and offended private parties to reach a mutually satisfac-
tory bargain about the allocation of cost and resource use. 186 
Which solution best fits the problem of transboundary acid rain 
between Canada and the United States? For purposes of this analysis 
it will be assumed that each of the approaches identified above can 
make a significant contribution given the proper context. 187 This 
writer believes that ideological or normative stances on any side of 
the issue are counter-productive and can lead to the anomaly that 
Ida Hoos characterized as the situation of a drunk looking for his 
wallet under a street light, not because he lost it there, but because 
181 Hardin, supra note 5, at 1245. 
182 Hahn & Richards, supra note 2, at 421. 
183 Benefit of the Commons, supra note 173, at 92, 93. Through the use of case studies, the 
authors show that, in the proper situation, communality can be even more effective than 
governmental regulation. See id. at 91-93. They define a commons as a media or resource 
where control of access is difficult or impossible and where the use of the resource by one 
detracts from its general use, so that individual and social interests are potentially at odds. 
[d. at 91. 
184 See id. at 91-93. 
186 See Coase, supra note 6, at 1. 
186 See id. at 4, 5. 
187 An analysis of the validity of what has come to be known as the Law and Economics 
approach to environmental policy is well beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that 
both its proponents and its detractors are legion. A basic text in support of the approach is 
B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981) (asserting that command and 
control regulations are inefficient). For a contrary view, see Sagoff, Economic Theory and 
Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1393 (1981). 
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the light made his search easier there. 188 Looking under each street 
light, or policy position, identified above, then, we can see first that 
Hardin's coercive law approach has been inapplicable. Unlike the 
ozone depletion problem that eventually resulted in the command-
and-controp89 regulatory regime for the Montreal Protocol, the 
United States-Canada acid rain problem has not yet proved amen-
able to a regulatory solution. 
As previous sections of this Article explained, the acid rain prob-
lem has lacked the requisite United States domestic political support 
that is pivotal in reaching agreement on bilateral regulation. 190 More 
to the point, the Midwest coal lobby has proved to have sufficient 
power or clout to preclude a bilateral agreement. 191 In any case, 
lacking peculiar circumstances that marshalled sufficient domestic 
support for the Montreal Protocol, the acid rain problem has not 
been amenable to a bilateral regulatory solution. 192 
Similarly, a communality approach to the problem is not available. 
As indicated above, that solution requires sufficient cultural and 
historical bases that give rise to shared perceptions and values about 
the benefits that accrue to all by protection of the commons. Without 
these, the leverage of social pressure is unavailable. If transboun-
dary environmental law is in its infancy, then a spirit of transboun-
dary communality or communitarianism must surely be in its nas-
cency. Until that spirit has reached a higher level of development, 
communitarian extortions like Principle 21193 and the Memorandum 
of Intent, 194 without hard law to give them substance, will exert only 
minimal pressure, at best, on societal behavior. 
188 Lovins, Cost-Risk-Benefit Assessments in Energy Policy, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 911, 
912 (1977) (citing I. Hoos, The Assessment of Methodologies for Nuclear Waste Management 
(1976) (transcript». 
189 Stewart, Regulation, Innovation and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 
69 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1264 (1981). Command-and-control regimes have been defined as 
"measures that require or proscribe specific conduct by regulated firms." I d. 
190 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
191 This suggests that the situation is illustrative of public choice theory. For a discussion 
of that theory, see generally Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. 
L. REV. 873 (1987). 
192 See Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, art. 8, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1556. Additionally, 
as the avoidance of emission limitations by use of tall stacks illustrates and public policy theory 
suggests, the vulnerability of governmental resolve to the pressures of special interests, at 
both the legislative enactment and agency enforcement stages, mean that enforcement itself 
may be problematic. See generally id. If this is true at the domestic level, where the power 
to enforce is unquestionably available, it must be a dominant concern in bilateral or multina-
tional arrangements, where the means to enforce are, at best, severely limited. 
193 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 1, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. at 1420. 
194 See Memorandum of Intent, supra note 85. 
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Coase's Theorem offers another approach. As we have seen, the 
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement avoided the acid rain 
problem entirely. However, by improving the predictability and sta-
bility of bilateral trade in hydroelectricity, the FTA encourages in-
creased trade in that energy source. Because hydroelectricity is 
inherently cheaper than fossil fuel alternatives and because the price 
differential favoring hydroelectricity can be predicted to increase as 
United States Clean Air amendments rachet down emission limits, 
it can be anticipated that Canadian hydroelectricity will, to some 
extent, displace energy generated by United States facilities whose 
emissions contribute to acid rain. Thus, abatement of the acid rain 
problem, which eluded resolution during the FTA negotiations, will 
be achieved partially under its auspices through the bargaining of 
private parties. This variant of Coase's Theorem, the use of a free 
trade agreement, can be seen as a technique to facilitate curtailment 
of trans boundary pollution. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Growing awareness of the destructive effects of transboundary 
pollution has created a trend toward internationalization of environ-
mental law. Because of its success in establishing a regulatory sys-
tem for control of ozone-depleting substances, the Montreal Protocol 
is widely acclaimed as a prototype for control of other kinds of 
trans boundary pollution. However, unique scientific and technolog-
ical circumstances surrounded the formation and ratification of the 
Montreal Protocol. These circumstances may be conspicuously ab-
sent from other transboundary or global commons pollution situa-
tions. Lacking the assistance of these circumstances, proponents of 
bilateral and multilateral agreements may be unable to garner the 
requisite domestic political support for pollutant regulation. There-
fore, the use of the Montreal Protocol as a prototype may be limited. 
The United States-Canada FTA offers the most obvious case for 
using transboundary market mechanisms as a "bribe" to discourage 
behavior that creates transboundary pollution. The two countries 
are contiguous, and Canada has an abundant energy resource with 
which to bribe the United States market. Nevertheless, the appli-
cability of trans boundary market mechanisms is not limited to the 
United States/Canada situation. Any resource, not necessarily an 
energy resource, that, when marketed in the polluting country, un-
dercuts the price of products or industries that are environmentally 
more destructive will induce pollution abatement. The trick is simply 
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to make activities that generate the offending pollutants more ex-
pensive than relatively benign alternatives that are made available 
through bilateral markets. Trade agreements can encourage this 
phenomenon by a judicious and selective elimination of trade bar-
riers. 
Just as the latter half of the twentieth century has witnessed a 
distinct trend toward bilateral and multilateral environmental law, 
it has also been witness to the proliferation of free trade agreements 
between nations. 195 When the option of a hard law regulatory system 
is foreclosed, a free trade agreement like the FTA occasionally may 
act as an effective alternative to a regulatory approach by facilitating 
environmentally benign behavior through the operation of the mar-
ketplace. 196 
196 The 1992 European Community (EC) and the United States-Canada Free Trade Agree-
ment are examples of this phenomenon. The FTA is only the second free trade agreement to 
which the United States was a party-the first was with Israel-but negotiations already are 
underway for the formation of a free trade agreement with Mexico and even a free trade zone 
encompassing the Western Hemisphere. Auerbach, Bush Offers Proposals to Lower Latin 
Debt, Wash. Post, June 28, 1990, at C1, col. 4 (concerning free trade zone in the Western 
Hemisphere). 
196 Regarding the confederation crisis in Canada, Prime Minister Mulroney has declared a 
moratorium on the constitutional debate until the fall of 1990. Claiborne, Despite Pact Failure, 
Precipitous Breakup of Canada Unlikely, Wash. Post, June 26, 1990, at A15, col. 1. In any 
case, it is predicted that an economic unity of the country will endure. [d. 
